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other hand, one may argue that the pressure to achieve analyst expectations can promote the use of 
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Tämän tutkielman tarkoitus on tarkastella analyytikkoseurannan vaikutusta tuloksenohjaukseen 
suomalaisissa listatuissa yhtiöissä. Analyytikoiden ulkoisen valvonnan vaikutukseen on kaksi 
ilmeisen loogista, mutta päinvastaista, perustelua. Analyytikot voidaan nähdä ulkoisina 
tarkkailijoina, jotka valvovat johtoa ja pitävät heidät täten pois tuloksen manipuloinnista. Toisaalta 
paineet saavuttaa analyytikoiden asettamat odotukset voivat johdattaa heidät käyttämään näitä 
samoja keinoja. Aikaisemmat tutkimukset ovat keskittyneet lähinnä yhdysvaltalaisiin yhtiöihin sekä 
yksittäisiin tuloksenohjauskeinoihin, kun taas tämä tutkielma edistää tulosten maantieteellistä 
kattavuutta ja tarkkailee kolmea eri keinoa tavoitellen laajempaa näkökulmaa aiheeseen. 
 
Data analyytikkoseurannasta on kerätty IBES-tietokannasta ja yhtiöiden taloudelliset tiedot ovat 
Thomson Reuters Eikon- ja Orbis-tietokannoista sekä joissain tapauksissa vuosikertomuksista. 
Lopullinen otos on 1640 havaintoa vuosilta 2005–2018. Harkinnanvaraiset jaksotukset on arvioitu 
käyttäen muokattua Jonesin mallia (Dechow et al. 1995), kun taas myynnin manipulaatio sekä 
liikatuotanto on arvioitu seuraamalla Dechow et al. (1998) malleja hyödyntävää Roychowdhuryn 
(2006) menetelmää. Analyytikkoseurannan ja näiden kolmen tuloksenohjauskeinon suhteen 
analysointiin on käytetty PNS-menetelmää (OLS) sekä kaksivaiheista PNS-menetelmää (2SLS). 
 
Löydän vahvaa näyttöä siitä, että analyytikkoseuranta vaikuttaa yhtiöiden tapaan käyttää 
tuloksenohjausta. Tulokset osoittavat selkeästi merkitsevää käänteistä suhdetta seurannan ja 
jaksotuserien manipuloinnin välillä seurannanalaisten yhtiöiden käyttäessä sitä vähemmän, 
suuremman seurannan johtaessa sen vähäisempään käyttöön sekä seurantamuutosten aiheuttaessa 
käänteisiä muutoksia sen käytössä. Liikatuotanto osoittaa merkitsevää ja pääosin positiivista 
suhdetta seurantaan, mutta se koskee ainoastaan seurattavuutta sekä muutosten suuntaa eikä 
seurannan tasoa tai muutoksen suuruutta. Myynnin manipulointi sekä näiden kolmen menetelmän 
yhteenlaskettu käyttö eivät osoita merkitsevää suhdetta seurantaan. Tutkimuksen tulokset 
puoltavat molempia perusteluja analyytikoiden vaikutuksesta yhtiöiden johtoon – valvonta sekä 
paine suoriutua – korostaen tarvetta mitata tiedossa olevia keinoja erillään eikä käsitellä 
tuloksenohjausta yhtenä vaihtoehtoisten toimien ryhmänä. 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the behavioural effects that outside monitoring by stock market analysts 
has on managers in terms of their decisions to manipulate reported earnings. Due to a broad 
range of incentives for this type of behaviour and an availability of different methods to carry 
out these actions, valid findings of these questions can offer valuable insight to many areas of 
academic research as well as to market participants. By reviewing key earnings management 
literature and connecting that to the available research about the governance role of analysts, I 
create hypotheses and test them using data from Finnish listed companies, expanding the 
existing literature and offering ideas for future research. 
Managers sometimes have an incentive to manipulate reported earnings in order to influence 
how their financial reports display the company’s performance and situation. It is a case of 
managerial judgment which is commonly described as either an intent to mislead stakeholders 
in the form of inaccurate information, or as an attempt to incorporate management’s private 
information in reports for improved reporting value (Healy & Wahlen 1999). The reasons for 
such behaviour can come from either outside or inside factors such as external market 
expectations or internal management compensation schemes, most often leading to the benefit 
of either the company or individual managers. This manipulation can result in either higher or 
lower reported earnings, depending on the incentives and their requirements. 
A company’s reported earnings consist of its operational cash flows combined with certain 
adjustments that are made to those cash flows during the accounting process, both components 
of which can be used to manipulate reported earnings. The more traditional method involves the 
adjustments, or accruals. While some of those adjustments are required by accounting standards, 
others are voluntary and ultimately up to the manager’s discretion which can potentially enable 
manipulative behaviour. This discretionary portion of total accruals only affects the timing of 
cash flows and should thus reverse over time, but essentially, they can be used to raise or lower 
a period’s reported earnings. The other component of reported earnings, cash flows from 
operations, can be manipulated through actual business decisions such as temporarily 
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discounted terms or changing the level of discretionary expenses such as R&D or advertising, 
resulting in short-term earnings shifts. 
Stock market expectations, most often in the form of analyst estimates, are a key factor behind 
earnings management decisions. There is evidence that companies who meet or beat analyst 
estimates perform better than those that do not, both in the short and long terms (Bartov et al. 
2002). This puts pressure on managers to meet expectations which in some cases can be 
achieved through earnings management, raising the question whether a relationship can be 
found between analyst coverage and earnings management behaviour. Prior literature (Yu 2008, 
Degeorge et al. 2013) has shown that analyst coverage constrains accrual-based earnings 
management at least in countries of high financial development. On the other hand, the effect 
on real earnings management has been found to be the opposite (Sun & Liu 2016), showing a 
positive association between the two factors. When considering the use of both methods and the 
behaviour of managers, there is evidence from US companies which shows that firms 
simultaneously increase accrual-based earnings management and decrease real earnings 
management when losing coverage (Irani & Oesch 2016). This is in line with the documented 
evidence of managers’ behavioural preferences while under the watch of stakeholders such as 
auditors, regulators, or analysts (Graham et al. 2005). 
The connection between analyst coverage and earnings management behaviour offers an 
interesting research topic because there are logical arguments for why coverage could both 
increase and decrease manipulative actions. On one side is the “monitoring effect”, where 
analysts can be viewed as third-party governance observers who keep management away from 
hiding the true condition of their company and therefore not relying on earnings management. 
On the opposite side there is the “pressure effect”, based on which one may view the pressure 
of achieving analysts’ expectations as a factor which instead promotes the use of various forms 
of earnings management. Therefore, this raises a fascinating question as to what the true 
association is and how investors and other market participants should view the analyst-
management relationship. Is it better in terms of transparency for a company to have extensive 
analyst coverage, or does it inversely result in decisions that only contribute to short-term stock 
market performance? 
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The primary objective of this thesis is to examine how the quantity of analyst coverage 
influences managers’ earnings management decisions in Finnish listed companies. Earnings 
management is monitored through three methods covering both accrual-based and real earnings 
management, which offers a broad picture of managers’ behaviour and thus a better 
understanding of the full effects of analyst presence. These effects of coverage on the three 
methods – discretionary accrual use, sales manipulation, and overproduction – are examined 
both alone and by monitoring each other’s simultaneous changes. Analyst coverage is utilised 
both in terms of covered versus uncovered firms, the level of coverage, as well as through 
changes in coverage. Change is measured by numerical change, direction of change, and 
changes in coverage from zero to one and one to zero analysts. 
Using a sample of 1640 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2018, I find strong evidence that 
analyst coverage impacts the way firms choose to manage their earnings. There is a significant 
negative association between analyst coverage and discretionary accrual use, meaning that more 
coverage results in less of its use and vice versa. This result is present when comparing covered 
firms with uncovered firms as well as when measuring by the level of coverage. Additionally, 
similar results appear in situations of change as increases in coverage result in decreases in use 
of discretionary accruals. Coverage is also associated with overproduction, but the connection 
is mostly positive and not as distinct across all tests as with discretionary accruals. Finally, the 
evidence points towards a lack of association between coverage and sales manipulation as well 
as the combined use of these three earnings management methods. 
This study contributes to the existing literature surrounding the relationship between analyst 
coverage and earnings management use in several ways. Firstly, it expands the geographical 
coverage of research results on this topic by examining specifically Finnish listed companies. 
Most previous studies have been conducted using U.S. data which may not be comparable to 
markets in other geographical areas. There is prior literature indicating differences in the effects 
based on a country’s financial development (Degeorge et al. 2013) as well as level of investor 
protection (Sun 2009). For this reason, it is important to expand the understanding of 
behavioural patterns globally if looking for actionable benefits from research and practice. This 
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global expansion of results may also be beneficial in the global interpretation of behavioural 
patterns in other research areas.  
Secondly, this study contributes by including three methods of earnings management along with 
their combined use to expand the understanding of manager behaviour as well as the relationship 
between these different methods. The most prominent studies on this topic, such as that by Yu 
(2008), involve just one method which only allows a limited interpretation of the use of earnings 
management. Results from different studies can of course be combined but there will always be 
discrepancies in samples and methods which may impact the validity of conclusions. The results 
from this study highlight the importance of measuring the methods individually rather than 
treating methods under terms such as real earnings management as homogeneous groups. 
Speaking of samples, the third way in which this thesis contributes to existing research is 
through a more recent sample from years 2005 to 2018. Nearly all prior studies use data which 
does not include the 2010s, leaving a gap of uncertainty as to whether these results are still valid 
in a rapidly changing business and information environment. 
Lastly, this study contributes to future research by presenting a new instrumental variable option 
for analyst coverage. Using the variable of expected coverage based on brokerage size 
introduced by Yu (2008) as inspiration, I develop an alternative measure of expected coverage 
which does not require the brokerage-specific data of employed analysts. Instead, it uses total 
market analyst counts to capture the variation in a firm’s analyst coverage that is caused by 
change in overall analyst activity within the marketplace. 
This thesis consists of two major sections: the theoretical framework and the empirical research. 
After the introduction, it proceeds into presenting the topic of earnings management through 
definitions, incentives of use, and methods of measuring these activities. It then shifts to analyst 
coverage and further into the relationship with earnings management use by evaluating the role 
of analysts in financial markets. To finish off the theoretical framework, it presents the relevant 
literature on the topic of this thesis, offering an understanding of prior findings before 
proceeding to the empirical research. The empirical section begins with research design which 
explains the research hypotheses, introduces the chosen methodology, and describes the 
collection and use of the data sample. It then moves onto the experiments, testing the 
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relationship between analyst coverage and earnings management from various points of view. 
Chapter 6 contains discussion about the findings, their practical and academic significance, and 
the limitations of the study. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the conclusions of this study by 
reflecting on each section and sharing ideas for future research. 
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2 Earnings management 
This chapter begins the theoretical framework of this thesis, introducing the topic of earnings 
management, offering an in-depth literature review which helps better understand the results of 
prior studies as well as the findings of this thesis. The chapter begins by defining earnings 
management and its two major implementation methods, accrual-based and real earnings 
management. It then reviews some of the key research findings of each method in order to 
explain exactly how these methods are used and what their effects are. After this foundation, it 
explains the many incentives behind the use of earnings management, what benefits does it offer 
and to whom. Finally, it introduces various estimation models developed to detect and measure 
the use of earnings management, crucial tools used in this thesis as well as most of the research 
surrounding this topic. 
2.1 Defining earnings management 
It is important to first define clearly what the key terms in this thesis mean, both for proper 
understanding as well as comparability to other research in this area. There are different types 
of earnings management behaviour and therefore different definitions for each, but the most 
common definitions for the broad term come from Schipper (1989), and Healy and Wahlen 
(1999). 
Among the first definitions of earnings management, Schipper (1989, p. 92) described it as “a 
purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining 
some private gain”. Later, and perhaps nowadays more commonly referred to, Healy and 
Wahlen (1999, p. 368) gave a similar but more extensive definition: 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” 
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Many definitions of earnings management focus on managerial intent and highlight at least to 
some level the aim of misleading stakeholders. However, it should be noted that not all earnings 
management is opportunistic in nature since there is always some discretion involved when 
applying accounting standards, such as with various estimates. Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
mention that, in addition to complying with reporting standards, financial reports should also 
convey management’s private information of the firm’s performance as a way of improving the 
value reporting offers to stakeholders. To do so effectively, they have various opportunities in 
terms of which reporting methods to utilise. 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) highlight that not using any earnings management is not an optimal 
solution, and that there are clearly different levels of earnings management all with different 
types of motivation and results. In line with Healy and Wahlen (1999) they also argue, for 
example, that a certain level of smoothing periodic cash flow fluctuations in order to generate 
more useful information for investors assessing a firm’s performance should not be considered 
misleading earnings management. This, however, is where the distinction between adding value 
and misleading comes into question, since auditing is not perfect and pressure from both internal 
and external stakeholders can affect management’s judgment. In Chapter 2.2, I examine the 
incentives behind earnings management in more depth. 
Earnings management is commonly divided into two types: accrual-based earnings management 
and real earnings management (Schipper 1989; Healy and Wahlen 1999). In the following two 
chapters I will go into these two types in more detail, discussing what they are, how they differ 
from each other, how they have been researched, and what the current trends look like in terms 
of earnings management behaviour. 
2.1.1 Accrual-based earnings management 
Healy (1985) explains that a company’s reported earnings are a combination of its operational 
cash flows and certain adjustments that are made to those cash flows during the accounting 
process. These adjustments are called accruals and they can be further divided into non-
discretionary and discretionary accruals. Non-discretionary accruals are adjustments that are 
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required by accounting standards such as systematic depreciation of long-term assets, whereas 
discretionary accruals are adjustments which accounting standards allow but are ultimately up 
to a manager’s discretion such as the method of that depreciation. Therefore, the use of 
discretionary accruals gives managers an opportunity to perform accrual-based earnings 
management in order to manipulate financial reporting, either to improve or weaken the earnings 
of a given accounting period.  
Since accruals are simply adjustments to the timing of cash flows they will eventually reverse 
with time, also known as accrual reversal, and in theory should not have long-term effects on 
future earnings. Therefore, poorly performing companies cannot use them to avoid negative 
earnings changes for long, whereas they give companies with consistent earnings growth an 
opportunity for more flexibility with earnings. For example, they can use accruals to smoothen 
earnings over the short-term as well as over longer business cycles. While accrual reversal 
should cancel out any long-term effects on future earnings, some behavioural findings have been 
made especially in the field of finance. For example, Sloan (1996) found a significance in the 
information value of accrual and cash flow distribution with regards to valuation, as high levels 
of accruals resulted in lower future stock returns according to his research. From this he 
concluded that investors overestimate the persistence of accruals. 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) demonstrated the different levels of accrual-based earnings 
management as well as their differentiation from fraud by placing accounting choices on a scale 
ranging from conservative to fraudulent accounting. According to them, companies can decrease 
earnings by using conservative adjustments such as over-recognition of provisions or reserves 
as well as overvaluing various acquisition- and restructuring-related expenses or write-offs. On 
the other hand, earnings can be aggressively improved through actions such as overstating 
provisions for bad debts or drawing down provisions prematurely. They also highlighted that 
there is a clear distinction between these actions and those considered fraudulent, such as 
recording unrealizable or fictitious sales, or falsely overstating inventory. 
Of the two main earnings management methods discussed in this thesis, accruals and cash flows 
from real activities, discretionary accruals have been the more traditional subject of academic 
research for decades and their connection to other business behaviour has been studied across a 
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wide variety of topics. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provided evidence clearly showing that 
firms manage earnings in order to avoid both decreases in earnings as well as absolute losses. 
They analysed the distribution of earnings changes and total earnings and found significant 
differences in the frequency of small earnings decreases compared to small earnings increases 
around zero. This was a result of earnings management through a combined use of both accruals 
and cash flows from operations, which is often the case especially in more recent literature. 
Becker et al. (1998) studied how audit quality impacts the use of discretionary accruals and 
found that companies with non-Bix Six auditors (a proxy for lower audit quality), increase their 
earnings significantly more through discretionary accruals than those with Bix Six auditors. 
Both the median and absolute use of discretionary accruals were also greater among firms with 
lower audit quality. Similar results of how audit quality can restrain managers’ opportunistic 
use of accrual-based earnings management have been found by others as well (Krishnan 2003; 
Kim et al. 2003).  
The aggressive use of discretionary accruals and equity offerings, both initial and seasoned, has 
been widely researched and found to have a clear link with future stock returns. Both Rangan 
(1998) and Teoh et al. (1998) showed that companies who use discretionary accruals to report 
higher net income prior to or around the time of seasoned equity offering yield lower abnormal 
returns and net income both for the following year and long-term. DuCharme et al. (2001) also 
found similar results when researching initial public offerings (IPO). An abnormally high use 
of accruals, both in the year prior to the IPO as well as the actual IPO year, showed a significant 
negative relation with post-IPO investor returns. They also compared IPO valuations based on 
the use of accruals and found that firms with higher levels of discretionary accruals received 
higher initial valuations than those firms with less managed accruals. Additionally, when 
comparing how the different components of reported earnings effect valuation, they found that 
discretionary accruals were valued similarly to unmanaged accruals and even higher than cash 
flows from actual operations. 
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2.1.2 Real earnings management 
In addition to manipulating accruals within the accounting process, managers also have the 
option of making actual business decisions which will help them reach short-term earnings 
benchmarks. While discretionary accruals are only methods of accounting and do not impact a 
company’s operations, real earnings management through actual operational decisions directly 
affects cash flows. Roychowdhury (2006, p. 337) defines real earnings management as: 
“Departures from normal operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire to 
mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have 
been met in the normal course of operations.” 
He further explains that while many of the activities used for real earnings management may be 
beneficial and optimal for a company in some situations, abnormal or continuous use of these 
methods reflects a motivation to meet or beat earnings targets instead of making optimal long-
term decisions. In the study, he researched the use of operational activities in earnings 
management, specifically the methods used and whether certain firm-specific factors influenced 
the scope of real earnings management. There was clear evidence that institutional ownership 
restricts the use of such methods, which in return raises questions about whether these activities 
are economically optimal if the presence of knowledgeable investors restricts it.  
Some other firm-specific factors were also found to positively associate with the use of real 
earnings management, such as presence of debt outstanding and manufacturing industry 
membership. Firms with high market-to-book ratios, also called growth firms due to their good 
growth opportunities, indicated a positive connection as well though not as strong. Some 
explanation to this is offered by Skinner and Sloan (2002), who found that growth firms 
experience much greater negative responses to missing earnings benchmarks, thus motivating 
managers to avoid them by using earnings management. Several studies, including 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), also found a strong link between 
firms trying to avoid negative earnings surprises and their use of real earnings management, 
with the common methods of achieving this including sales manipulation, overproduction of 
goods and reduction of discretionary expenses. These three methods have become common 
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indicators in the detection of real earnings management. Dechow and Skinner (2000) also 
mention similar methods as they explain how deciding to accelerate or delay sales, or advance 
or postpone discretionary expenses can all be used in order to achieve a desired change in 
earnings for a given reporting period, while staying within the limits generally accepted 
accounting principles. 
Roychowdhury (2006) explains that by temporarily discounting prices or offering other 
affordable terms, a firm can manipulate its sales and thus create a short-term boost which 
improves its reported numbers for that period. Since lower prices most often lead to lower 
margins, these are in many cases not economically optimal practices and mainly contribute to 
short-term improvement. In manufacturing firms, earnings can also be manipulated through 
production levels, specifically in the form overproduction which leads to a lower per unit cost 
as fixed costs are spread across more units. This results in a lower cost of goods sold for those 
units and thus better operating margins in the reporting period. This can, however, also cause 
extra costs such as storage which would not be recovered from sales due to the surplus of 
inventory, therefore utilising overproduction only makes sense if these costs do not override the 
acquired benefits in cost of goods sold. Finally, improving earnings by cutting discretionary 
expenditure is commonly used since they are typically written off in the same period and many 
of these expenses are not in direct connection with current period sales. Examples of such items 
may include expenses from research and development, administration, and some advertising. 
Of course, temporary reductions can have a negative effect on future period sales since there 
should be a reason why they were originally in place. 
In recent years, real earnings management has increasingly gained popularity within the 
academic discussion and research seems to now be focusing more on it instead of accrual-based 
earnings management. The topics have been similar to those mentioned earlier in Chapter 2.1.1, 
for example the connections with audit quality and equity offerings, along with other topics such 
as cost of capital and board independence.  
Chi et al. (2011) found strong and consistent evidence that both higher audit quality and longer 
auditor tenure are linked to more use of real earnings management among companies with 
motivation to manage earnings. They argue that it is used as an alternative to accrual-based 
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earnings management which, as mentioned earlier, higher audit quality has been proven to 
restrict (Becker et al. 1998; Krishnan 2003; Kim et al. 2003). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) also 
found a higher amount of real earnings management around seasoned equity offerings in the 
presence of a higher audit quality and longer auditor tenure. Additionally, when comparing the 
use of accrual-based and real earnings management in these situations, they found that engaging 
in real earnings management was more associated with future years’ earnings declines and thus 
appeared to be more harmful.  
With regards to cost of capital, several studies have shown that capital markets take notice of 
the use of real earnings management and demand a higher risk premium in these cases. Kim and 
Sohn (2013) researched this with regards to cost of equity capital and found a clear association 
regardless of the documented costliness of using real earnings management, suggesting 
opportunistic short-sightedness among managers. Ge and Kim (2014) studied the effect 
specifically on new corporate bonds and found that overproduction has a negative effect on 
credit ratings, while overproduction and sales manipulation link to larger spreads in bond yields.  
In a commonly cited study, which appears to have inspired somewhat of a shift in the earnings 
management literature from discretionary accruals more towards real earnings management, 
Graham et al. (2005) surveyed over 400 CFO’s about their opinions and preferences regarding 
earnings benchmarks and managing earnings. The goal was to understand how managers think 
and behave in comparison to the theoretical framework on this topic. According to the results, 
managers consider outside parties to have more interest in reported earnings rather than cash 
flows, and that meeting key benchmarks is crucial for credibility and worth the trade-off 
between short-term market pleasing and long-term value creation. 78% of the respondents 
preferred smooth earnings at the cost of economic value, the main reason being the short-term 
overreactions in stock price caused by earnings surprises.  
But the key takeaway from the survey by Graham et al. (2005), at least for the purpose of this 
thesis, was that the surveyed managers demonstrated a much higher willingness to manage 
earnings though real activities rather than accounting accruals. One of the explanations given to 
this had to do with auditors and their ability to evaluate the two methods of manipulation, and 
how the use of discretionary accruals is easy for them to question whereas challenging real 
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business activities as a way of manipulation is very difficult to prove. Other responses also 
highlighted a specific effort to avoid any numbers-based earnings management, especially due 
to strict regulatory oversight in the aftermath of accounting scandals and the subsequent passing 
of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in the United States in 2002. 
SOX is a significant part of the earnings management discussion and its impact on management 
behaviour has been researched in great depth. In short, the legislation was passed in the wake of 
several financial scandals, most notably the Enron scandal, and was meant to hinder 
misbehaviour on the management level by requiring more oversight, tightening governance and 
audit standards, and holding management accountable for the accuracy of financial statements 
via tougher consequences (Zhang 2007). Cohen et al. (2008) studied the differences in earnings 
management pre- and post-SOX and found clear evidence of a significant shift in behaviour as 
a result of the law. They found that accrual-based earnings management increased leading up to 
2002 and then decreased sharply afterwards, while the use of real earnings management 
experienced a similar but opposite development. They argue that the new legislation steered 
managers more towards manipulating earnings through real activities instead of using 
accounting-based methods, consistent with the survey results from Graham et al. (2005) as well 
as the findings by Roychowdhury (2006). 
This thesis focuses on Finnish firms and therefore SOX should not significantly affect them. 
However, all publicly listed firms in the EU were required to transition from local country 
accounting rules to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005, including 
Finnish listed companies, and this adoption has also been researched with regards to its effects 
on earnings management behaviour. The results are not as consistent as those related to SOX, 
as many studies, such as Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) and Callao and Jarne (2010), have in fact 
found an increase in earnings management activity since the adoption of IFRS especially with 
regards to the use of discretionary accruals. Other studies, including Barth et al. (2008) and 
Zeghal et al. (2012), suggest an improvement in earnings quality but it is worth noting that all 
these studies focus on slightly different aspects of IFRS. For example, some focus on early 
adapters while others only consider firms that transitioned once IFRS become mandatory, 
therefore the results may be conflicting and should thus not be overgeneralised. 
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Doukakis (2014) researched the effects of mandatory adoption of IFRS on both accrual-based 
and real earnings management using a broad sample of European firms, also comparing them to 
earlier voluntary adopters. The results showed no significant positive or negative impact of the 
IFRS adoption on the levels of either accrual-based or real earnings management. Tirkkonen 
(2013) also studied the impacts of IFRS adoption with regards to both accrual-based and real 
earnings management, however she focused on only Finnish listed companies which is highly 
relevant to this thesis. Her findings suggest that the transition from Finnish Accounting 
Standards (FAS) to IFRS increased the use of both accrual-based earnings management as well 
as one aspect of real earnings management, overproduction, in Finnish listed companies. The 
level of sales manipulation did not exhibit a statistically significant difference between the use 
of these two accounting standards. She also found significant changes in levels of both sales 
manipulation and overproduction during the data period in different years and specifically 
different economic environments, which were unrelated to IFRS adoption. This suggests that 
companies may adjust earnings management behaviour based on the existing macroeconomic 
situation, for which some prior evidence also exists (Agarwal et al. 2007). 
2.2 Earnings management incentives 
The reasons why managers decide to engage in earnings management, despite the many long-
term downsides mentioned in previous chapters, have been studied in great depth. This is crucial 
information in order to better understand manager behaviour and ultimately set reporting 
guidelines and other regulation which improve transparency and discourage misuse. Most 
studies, such as Dechow and Skinner (2000) as well as the literature review by Healy and 
Wahlen (1999), mention capital market expectations and valuation as the main reason for 
earnings management. Additionally, managers are motivated to act by contractual reasons, both 
internal and external, as well as other reason such as regulation. This chapter discusses such 
incentives in more detail and offers examples for each category. 
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2.2.1 Market-related incentives 
Financial reports shared by companies are a primary source of information based on which 
investors and analysts form a valuation and hence influence stock prices. Therefore, it can create 
an incentive for managers to shape that information in a way which displays the company as 
they wish and influences short-term market performance. Three key market-related benchmarks 
are repeated in prior literature for having an impact on managers’ earnings management 
behaviour: meeting or beating analyst forecasts, reporting positive earnings and avoiding losses, 
and reporting higher earnings than in the comparison period (Degeorge et al. 1999; Dechow & 
Skinner 1999). Additionally, studies have shown that companies manage earnings by both 
increasing and decreasing them, depending on what is beneficial to their situation (Burgstahler 
& Eames, 2006; Nelson et al. 2001; Bartov et al. 2002).  
Stock market expectations, most often in the form of analyst estimates, are a key factor behind 
earnings management decisions. Bartov et al. (2002) present evidence that companies that meet 
or beat analyst estimates perform better, both in the following quarter and three following years, 
compared to those that do not. They argue that the positive earnings surprise offers investors 
information of future performance which improves their confidence in the company and thus 
rewards it with better stock market returns.  
The second benchmark incentive which managers thrive for is to report positive earnings or 
avoid losses. As mentioned earlier, Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) found clear evidence that 
managers are under pressure to report positive earnings, as the frequency of earnings just above 
zero is much higher than earnings just below zero. Furthermore, they estimated pre-managed 
earnings and compared them to reported earnings, finding that 30 to 44 percent of companies 
showing a small pre-managed loss were found to take actions in order to report a profit. This is 
consistent with Degeorge et al. (1999) who found a hierarchy among the three common 
benchmarks, stating that reporting a profit is most important, followed by reporting at least equal 
earnings as one year earlier, and lastly meeting or beating analyst estimates.  
Reporting growing earnings is the third market-related benchmark which has been found to 
impact managers’ earnings manipulation behaviour. Barth et al. (1999) researched the 
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phenomena of increasing earnings and found that, after controlling for other factors such as 
growth and risk, the market awards companies with this type of earnings history with 
significantly higher price-to-earnings multiples. Furthermore, the longer a company’s trend of 
yearly earnings increases continues for, the higher its price-to-earnings multiple gets, with the 
largest single-year increase occurring between years four and five. For even more evidence, they 
showed that when the pattern is broken the earnings multiple experiences a significant reduction 
as well. If a company reports a decrease in earnings for two consecutive years after an earlier 
trend of increases, the earlier benefits of a positive pattern in its valuation multiple disappear 
completely. Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) also included this in their study and found that 8 to 
12 percent of companies with a small pre-managed earnings decrease took actions to adjust their 
earnings and show an increase. These figures along with the higher percentages mentioned 
earlier for managing a small loss into reporting a profit are also consistent with the hierarchy of 
importance presented by Degeorge et al (1999). They assumed the same reasons as those 
mentioned above for avoiding losses also result in this behaviour.  
In some cases, market-based incentives may also cause firms to use downward earnings 
management. Two examples of this are to smoothen earnings downwards in the case of a very 
strong year, and secondly for a new executive to decrease earnings in their first year to then be 
able to report growing earnings in future years. DeFond and Park (1997) found that 92% of 
companies who they predicted to have an incentive to decrease earnings took such actions 
through discretionary accruals management. They explain that when earnings for the current 
period are relatively higher than what is expected for future periods, managers will smoothen 
earnings by shifting earnings to future years. The use of earnings management surrounding 
executive changes has been researched extensively, and most studies find large discretionary 
write-offs also described as the initial “earnings bath” during the first year of an executive’s 
tenure (Pourciau 1993; Ali & Zheng 2015). The incentive behind this is to enable a new 
executive to report increasing earnings in future years and perhaps blame the first year’s 
performance on the previous management. 
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2.2.2 Contractual incentives 
While market-related incentives are central in the use of earnings management, contractual 
incentives such as those related to debt contracts and management compensation also impact 
such behaviour in a significant way. Healy and Wahlen (1999) explain that managers need to 
keep the interests of both their shareholders and creditors in balance, and for this reason most 
debt contracts include covenants which often restrict the level of risk managers can take. These 
covenants are typically financial ratios with requirements and limits within which they must 
stay. Violating a covenant can be costly and therefore managers of companies that are close to 
their covenant levels may be incentivised to use earning management.  
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) researched firms who violated financial covenants and found that 
these firms had used significant amounts of discretionary accruals to improve earnings in the 
year prior to reporting the covenant violation. This is consistent with the common view that debt 
contract covenants incentivise earnings management. They also analysed the firms’ behaviour 
during the year of violation and found evidence of some positive accruals, however noting that 
at this point it would no longer be beneficial to heavily manipulate earnings for the covenants’ 
sake since the violation is already public. On the other hand, DeAngelo et al. (1994) argued that 
the decision by managers of financially distressed companies to use discretionary accruals is 
mostly a result of acknowledging the firm’s financial distress, not to avoid debt covenants. In 
fact, their results show that troubled firms as a group show consistent large negative accruals, 
meaning they systematically decrease reported earnings even further. They speculate that these 
earnings management decisions could be caused by managers trying to highlight their firms’ 
financial troubles and use that to gain better terms when renegotiations existing contracts. 
Another aspect of contractual incentives includes internal management compensation contracts. 
Since it has such an obvious and direct connection to the earnings management decisions made 
within a company, this topic has been heavily researched over the past decades. Healy (1985) 
found that typical compensation contracts incentivise managers to make both income-increasing 
as well as income-decreasing adjustments, depending on the situation. While maximising 
earnings traditionally helps managers reach their compensation limits, there are also situations 
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where the opposite actions make sense. If a bonus contract has an upper limit, managers may be 
incentivised to decrease earnings in a good year and postpone them to the following year in 
order not to waste any of the bonus potential. Alternatively, if the contract has a lower limit and 
that limit is not reached in a bad year, managers may be incentivised to decrease earnings even 
further and thus increase the chances of earning a bonus in the following year. 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) examined whether the significant rise in popularity of stock- 
and option-based compensation in the 1980’s, 1990’s and early 2000’s resulted in a greater 
incentive for managers to manipulate reported earnings. The study found evidence that 
companies with higher rates of such CEO incentivization showed higher rates of earnings 
management. Furthermore, these CEO’s exercised options and sold shares in unusually high 
volumes during years when their share of accruals to total reported earnings was high.  
2.2.3 Other incentives 
In addition to market-related and contractual incentives, there are also various other reasons 
which can motivate firms to engage in earnings management behaviour. Some benefit the 
company through ways such as enjoying the advantages of import relief, avoiding anti-trust 
investigations or influencing prices of acquisition. Others result in personal gain for managers, 
such as through stock ownership, career outlook or bonuses. 
Jones (1991) researched the connection between the timing of import relief investigations and 
the earnings management activity of companies in specific industries. Import relief is used by 
governments to protect domestic producers from excessive competition and one of the criteria 
used when investigating possible target industries is the profitability of these industries. The 
relief may come in many forms, such as tariffs, subsidies, tax benefits or affordable financing. 
Naturally, companies whose industries receive favourable import relief decisions will benefit 
from it financially and may have incentives to use accounting decisions to improve their 
chances. The study found that companies did in fact engage in income-decreasing earnings 
management through accruals during the years of these investigations into their industries. 
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Another similar politically driven topic are antitrust investigations, where governments 
investigate whether certain companies have too much “market power” especially in situations 
such as mergers or acquisitions. Makar and Alam (1998) found that companies who are the 
subject of antitrust investigations in merger situations decrease their earnings in order to manage 
the potential cost of the political risk involved. In addition, those who reach a settlement 
regarding their case continue to use income-decreasing earnings management afterwards in case 
of subsequent situations. 
Mergers and acquisitions often involve the use of stock as at least part of the payment, which 
means that managers may be able to make more affordable transactions if they can influence 
their firm’s stock price in the short term. When a purchase price is agreed upon, the parties also 
agree on how many shares of the acquirer will the target company’s shareholders receive in 
exchange for their existing shares. This means that the higher the acquirer’s share price is, the 
fewer shares it must give in exchange for the target company, creating incentive for managers 
to manage earnings upwards. Several studies show that this theoretical phenomenon is real, for 
example Erickson and Wang (1999) found that companies managed their earnings upwards 
through positive accruals in the period prior to announcing a merger, and that such actions were 
more aggressive as the size of the deal increased. They then compared these results to mergers 
which were executed as cash offers and found that in those transactions such earnings 
management was not present, adding evidence to the link between earnings management and 
share for share purchases. Botsari and Meeks (2008) found similar evidence from the UK in 
1997-2001, a period during which mergers were at record levels.  
Managers also have incentives to manipulate earnings for their personal benefit, perhaps most 
commonly through equity ownership in their firm. Cheng and Warfield (2005) examined the 
connection between equity incentives and earnings management and explain that as a general 
guideline a manager’s high equity ownership causes them to consider how this impacts the 
sensitivity of their total wealth. This is highlighted among those managers with heavy equity-
based compensation plans as they tend to sell more of their shares compared to other managers. 
Since they sell more shares, they are also more conscious of share price volatility and thus more 
incentivised to take action to reduce those movements. Cheng and Warfield (2005) found 
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evidence that a higher managerial equity ownership results in more earnings management as 
well as a higher likelihood of the company meeting or just beating market expectations. As 
mentioned earlier, companies which do not achieve this are punished by the market resulting in 
negative price changes. They also found that these managers prefer smooth earnings and are 
less likely to report significant positive earnings surprises, rather reserving earnings and 
avoiding disappointments in subsequent periods. 
2.3 Methods of measuring earnings management 
Prior literature has proposed various models for measuring the extent of both accrual-based and 
real earnings managements. However, it is important to keep in mind that these are all only 
estimations and typically relevant with only large samples. They are based on assumptions since 
it is impossible to perfectly distinguish between warranted accounting adjustments or real 
operating decisions and similar actions taken with the main objective of manipulating reported 
numbers. Especially with recent literature suggesting somewhat of a shift away from accruals 
and more towards real earnings management through operations, companies may be capable of 
hiding these actions more effectively. After all, one of the reasons companies engage in earnings 
management is to mislead stakeholders, as mentioned by Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368), and 
therefore it should be expected that managers do their best to hide these actions. 
The following two chapters will present some of the more common methods of measuring both 
accruals-based and real earnings management. The methods used in this thesis will be further 
expanded upon in Chapter 4.2. 
2.3.1 Measuring accrual-based earnings management 
A company’s reported earnings compose of cash flows from operations and accounting accruals. 
Accruals on the other hand consist of non-discretionary and discretionary accruals, the latter 
being the component of earnings management. If no earnings management were to exists, total 
accruals would thus equal non-discretionary accruals. Therefore, when measuring accruals-
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based earnings management, the process usually starts from total accruals and moves towards 
separating its two components, and ultimately identifying the amount of discretionary accruals.  
Several models have been created over the years in order to accomplish this, of which some of 
the most prominent were analysed by Dechow et al. (1995) in a key study that has since become 
one central piece of earnings management literature. These models include ones put forth by 
Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), and Jones (1991), as well as a modification of the Jones model 
by Dechow et al. (1995) and the Industry Model by Dechow and Sloan (1991). These models 
are described below, however, to summarise the results by Dechow et al. (1995), they showed 
that all five models passed the analysis and that the modified Jones model was found to be the 
most effective in detecting accrual-based earnings management. 
The model proposed by Healy (1985) is considered the first notable model introduced to 
earnings management literature. It is relatively simple, using the mean of total accruals scaled 
by lagged total assets and comparing them between three different sample groups. In one of 
them earnings are predicted to be manager upwards and in the other two groups they are 
predicted to be managed downwards. This model assumes that earnings management occurs in 
all periods, whereas most other models use an estimation period during which no systematic 
earnings management is assumed to exist, in order to fulfil the requirement of at least one 
estimated parameter.  
The model by DeAngelo (1986) is similar to the Healy model, however it assumes no earnings 
management in the first period and uses that period’s total accruals as a proxy for non-
discretionary accruals. If choosing between these two models, Dechow et al. (1995) suggests 
that the decision be made depending on the qualities of non-discretionary accruals. The 
DeAngelo model is more appropriate if they follow a random walk, whereas the Healy model is 
suitable if they track more around a constant mean. 
The Jones (1991) model is perhaps the most famous and widely used model for estimating 
accrual-based earnings management. It is a regression model which attempts to control for the 
changes which happen in a company’s economic circumstances by utilising changes in revenue 
levels as well as property, plant and equipment as explanatory variables. Dechow et al. (1995) 
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argue that the assumption in the Jones model, that all revenues are non-discretionary, results in 
the removal of any earnings coming from revenues managed at the discretion of managers. As 
a result, they present a modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) in which the change in 
revenues is adjusted for the change in receivables. Thus, it assumes all changes in credit sales 
to be a result of earnings management because this is considered easier than manipulating cash 
sales. This thesis uses the modified Jones model to estimate accrual-based earnings 
management, the model is presented in more depth in Chapter 4.2. 
Lastly, the Industry Model by Dechow and Sloan (1991) assumes that companies within the 
same industry share similar non-discretionary accruals. Thus, it estimates firm-specific 
parameters by utilising the median value of total accruals within that industry. Since it relies on 
the similarity of companies, any large changes in non-discretionary accruals resulting from firm-
specific circumstances rather than those on an industry-level will potentially impair results. 
2.3.2 Measuring real earnings management 
While accrual-based earnings management has been researched for decades and several models 
have been developed for its estimation as listed above, real earnings management is a more 
recent field of study and therefore has not yet seen as much methodological advancement. A 
majority of quantitative studies on real earnings management rely on a process outlined by 
Roychowdhury (2006) which uses models originally developed by Dechow et al. (1998) to 
estimate three real earnings management metrics: abnormal cash flow from operations, 
abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses. Abnormal cash flow from 
operations and abnormal production costs are commonly referred to as sales manipulation and 
overproduction, respectively. These models provide an estimation of the normal level at which 
these metrics should be based on a firm’s characteristics as well as its industry and year, which 
can then be compared to the actual reported level and thus used to derive the abnormal level of 
the metric. Since the process used by Roychowdhury (2006) is widely accepted and utilised in 
real earnings management research, this thesis also uses it for the measurement of sales 
manipulation and overproduction. The models and their details are further explained and 
presented in Chapter 4.2 alongside other research design choices.  
 23 
3 Analyst coverage and earnings management behaviour 
This chapter reviews relevant literature on analysts and their role in the capital market, 
specifically from a governance point of view to which earnings management is associated. First 
it looks at the general effect of analyst presence on firm activities, and then discusses prior 
research on the specific topic of this thesis, analyst coverage and earnings management. 
3.1 The governance role of analysts 
One of the key factors in researching the relationship between analyst coverage and earnings 
management is understanding the role of financial analysts in the capital market, especially from 
a governance point of view. Analysts are certainly considered to have an important role in 
improving the flow of information in markets. For example, Healy and Palepu (2001) explain 
in their literature review that analysts add value to markets especially through improved market 
efficiency, as firms with more following show a faster incorporation of reported financial 
information in stock prices.  
As for the monitoring role, Chen et al. (2015) found evidence of notable managerial degradation 
as a result of a decrease in analyst coverage, including worse contribution of cash holdings to 
shareholder value, excess CEO compensation, as well as a greater likelihood of value-destroying 
acquisitions. They also highlight that these effects are more significant among firms with a lower 
baseline coverage, possibly implying that loss of monitoring in their case leads to a more 
substantial loss in oversight compared in firms with large followings. These findings relate to 
the idea of agency costs, and in a key article on the topic by Jensen and Meckling (1976) they 
discussed that specifically security analysts employed by various parties of the capital market 
should play a key role in the monitoring activities to limit and balance these deficiencies of the 
market mechanism. 
Dyck et al. (2010) researched the detection of corporate fraud in major U.S. companies and 
determined what share of it comes from different players. They found that the detection is 
broadly divided and not in fact dominated by government oversight agencies. Instead, the group 
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with the highest share of externally discovered detections, in other words outside the 
management team and board, is employees (17%). Analyst were found to count for about 14% 
of cases which is a higher share than for example that of the media (13%), auditors (11%) or the 
SEC (7%). They also discuss the incentives for analysts to expose frauds or not, showing that 
such whistleblowing is more likely to come from successful analysts with little to worry about 
in terms of potential consequences from the object companies. Knyazeva (2017) also examined 
the role monitoring role of analysts and its effects, finding that the effect of analyst coverage on 
firm behaviour was similar to that of corporate governance, resulting in a broad range of benefits 
such as higher returns, better voluntary disclosure, and less earnings management. 
Overall, prior literature on the governance role of analysts suggests that while their main 
responsibilities may be related to the distribution of information resulting in better market 
efficiency, significant signs of a secondary oversight role can also be found. 
3.2 Prior research 
The relationship between analyst coverage and earnings management has been discussed to 
some extent in prior literature. However, since the topic contains various aspects such as 
different types of earnings management and the effects of different economic environments, the 
depth of findings is not so substantial. Many of the earlier studies focus on accrual-based 
earnings management since it is considered easier to detect, and they also use mostly US data 
due to its ease of access and broad availability. 
The prominent study on this topic is by Yu (2008) who directly studied the effect of analyst 
coverage on managers’ earnings management behaviour. He used the modified Jones model to 
analyse 33,127 observations of discretionary accruals in the US from 1988 to 2002 and found 
that greater analyst coverage resulted in lower use of discretionary accruals. The results also 
showed that companies covered by analysts used less discretionary accruals than those not 
covered by analysts. As an additional aspect, the study considered how various analyst 
characteristics affect earnings management behaviour, finding that both analyst experience as 
well as belonging to a top brokerage resulted in lower absolute use of discretionary accruals by 
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managers. The study highlighted a potential endogeneity problem regarding the connection 
between analysts and management behaviour which affects all the studies on this topic, arguing 
that since analysts tend to focus on companies with better information environments, they may 
avoid companies engaging in aggressive earnings management. The effects of this would in turn 
appear as results similar to those found in the study. He addressed this by using two alternative 
variables which also affect analyst coverage, inclusion in the S&P 500 index and expected 
coverage based on change of brokerage size, which he found to result in similar associations 
with the use of earnings management. 
Another study which used discretionary accruals was carried out by Degeorge et al. (2013), who 
took an international perspective and compared the link between analyst coverage and earnings 
management in countries with different levels of financial development. They used similar 
methods as Yu (2008) and a time range of 1994 to 2002 with a total of 65,799 observations from 
21 different countries which were subsequently divided into three levels of financial 
development. The results showed that increased analyst coverage resulted in less accrual-based 
earnings management activity, but only in countries with high financial development. This 
evidence was not found in countries of either medium or low financial development, neither was 
any trend found between the three groups. For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to 
mention that Finland was one of these countries and was placed in the lowest level group. For 
Finland, they identified 203 firm-year observations, 69% of firms being covered by analysts, 
and a mean coverage of 5.9 analysts per firm. They recorded that Finnish companies under 
analyst coverage had earnings management activity of 6.2% of total assets while those not 
covered scored 4.5%, being the largest difference among all included countries. 
Prior literature has revealed an increase in the use of real earnings management especially in the 
U.S. since the passing of SOX in 2002, making it a valuable part of modern research in this area. 
In a recent study, Sun and Liu (2016) examined the impact of analyst coverage on real earnings 
management, focusing on US companies from 1996 to 2006 with a sample of 9,086 
observations. Using abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, 
and abnormal production costs as proxies for real earnings management, they found evidence 
of a positive association between analyst coverage and real earnings management. More 
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specifically, the results showed a positive association between analyst coverage and the use of 
both up- and downwards real earnings management. Looking at results for the three different 
methods separately, abnormal cash flows (sales manipulation) and abnormal production costs 
(overproduction) show more significant results while results for abnormal discretionary 
expenses are not as significant. These results are opposite of those found by Yu (2008) regarding 
accrual-based earnings management, perhaps indicating that managers remain under pressure to 
reach expectations and consider real earnings management to be more difficult to monitor and 
dispute. 
If one wishes to establish a complete picture of earnings management behaviour, it makes sense 
to consider both accrual-based and real earnings management together. Sun (2009) used a 
simplified method to combine the two methods, calculating the ratio of absolute values of 
accruals to absolute value of cash flows from operations. He applied this in order to find how 
the connection between analyst coverage and earnings management varies in countries based on 
their investor protection. The sample included 47,999 observations from 23 countries between 
1990 and 2007. Unfortunately for this thesis, Finland was not one of those countries. The results 
highlight an increasingly negative association between analyst coverage and earnings 
management when moving towards weaker investor protection, suggesting that analysts’ 
governance role is more important in countries with weaker investor protection. 
There are not many studies which measure both earnings management methods as well as 
monitor their use in different situations alone and in connection to each other. However, Irani 
and Oesch (2016) attempted to do so among US companies from 1994 to 2015 but focused only 
on a specific subset of the available data in order to avoid the potential causality problem also 
referred to by Yu (2008). They utilised data on 13 brokerage mergers, as these often result in 
letting go of some analysts, to minimise the impact of analyst coverage changes caused by 
factors other than actual firm circumstances, resulting in a sample of 1,266 observations. The 
results show a decrease in real earnings management when a firm’s analyst coverage decreases, 
mostly coming from abnormal discretionary expenses such as R&D. They also found that firms 
simultaneously increase their accrual-based earnings management when losing coverage, 
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similar to the results from Graham et al. (2005) mentioned earlier regarding their preference 
while under scrutiny by stakeholders such as auditors or analysts. 
Another study which considered both methods of earnings management was performed by Hong 
et al. (2014) using 32,000 firm-year observations of U.S. data from 1989 to 2010. They focused 
heavily on the causality question using two effects both separately and jointly. The first is the 
monitoring effect that analyst coverage has on firms’ earnings management use, and the second 
is the information effect that earnings management use has on analysts’ willingness to follow a 
firm. They found that there is a simultaneous effect in both, as analyst following reduces 
earnings management while analysts also tend to follow companies with less earnings 
management. According to their analysis, these effects are jointly determined and not based on 
only one of the two. Using discretionary accruals for accrual-based earnings management and 
sales manipulation for real earnings management, they found both to be reduced by higher 
analyst coverage. They also found that higher levels of both methods have a significant negative 
information effect on analysts choosing to cover a firm. Additionally, they looked at the effect 
of the passing of SOX in 2002 and found that the information effect was present during the 
entire study period while the monitoring effect increased after 2002. 
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4 Research design 
The previous chapters introduced the theoretical framework upon which the topic of this thesis 
is based. Next, the thesis transitions to the empirical part, beginning with research design. It 
includes discussion and development of the research hypotheses, an introduction of the key 
methodology chosen for the empirical research, and explanations of the data collection process 
as well as descriptions of the key data points. 
4.1 Hypothesis development 
This study will test two hypotheses which have been defined based on the prior literature 
discussed in Chapter 3.2. The literature covers both accrual-based and real earnings 
management and offers mostly uniform conclusions for each method. However, the prior 
research has focused heavily on the United States and is mostly based on data from earlier time 
periods. Therefore, there is a possibility that those results are not comparable to this thesis which 
is limited to Finnish listed companies from years 2005 to 2018. Also, there is evidence that 
Finland may not be a market where these associations are present, which along with the lack of 
research increases the need to study this topic among Finnish firms (Degeorge et al. 2013). 
Accrual-based earnings management is measured in this thesis by discretionary accrual use as 
the evidence from prior literature on its connection to analyst coverage is rather solid. Most 
studies, notably Yu (2008), show that they are negatively associated and such more coverage 
results in less use. But there are also studies which raise questions as to the applicability of these 
results to Finnish firms. As mentioned above, Degeorge et al. (2013) found that this association 
does not apply to countries that are at Finland’s level of financial development. In fact, the study 
shows that Finnish firms with no coverage used discretionary accruals less than those with 
coverage, proposing rather a positive association. Though this is not based on multivariate 
analysis, only averages, and therefore it is necessary to include other factors that may also 
influence the use of earnings management. All in all, the evidence supporting a negative 
association can be considered substantial, and therefore the first hypothesis is defined as: 
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H1: Analyst coverage is negatively associated with the use of discretionary accruals 
The research on analyst coverage and real earnings management is not quite as comprehensive 
and does not include findings with regards to Finnish firms. Nonetheless, the results from the 
available, mostly U.S. based, studies are consistent and suggest a positive association. 
Therefore, this thesis uses sales manipulation and overproduction as proxies for real earnings 
management, and some evidence of a positive association has been found for both methods (Sun 
& Liu 2016). Based on the available framework, the second hypothesis is defined as: 
H2: Analyst coverage is positively associated with the use of sales manipulation and 
overproduction 
The first hypothesis can be seen as supporting the “monitoring” argument based on which 
analyst presence keeps managers away from manipulation, while the second hypothesis is in 
line with the “pressure” argument according to which the pressure to achieve analyst 
expectations steers managers toward manipulative actions. For a broad and deep enough view 
of the phenomenon, this thesis will examine the above hypotheses from various angles. It will 
look at analyst coverage as a characteristic of coverage versus no coverage, monitor different 
levels of coverage, as well as use several methods to measure the effects of changes in coverage. 
4.2 Methodology 
The methodology used in this thesis consists of two parts: estimation models used to form 
estimates of the use of the three earnings management methods, and regression models used to 
determine the relationship between earnings management and analyst coverage in the selected 
sample. This chapter introduces the models and methods chosen to be used in this thesis in more 
depth. 
4.2.1 Estimation models for earnings management 
The three earnings management metrics used in this thesis are discretionary accruals, sales 
manipulation and overproduction. Discretionary accruals are the discretionary portion of all 
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accrual adjustments available to be used by managers, sales manipulation refers to abnormal 
cash flows from operations, and overproduction means abnormal production costs. Below are 
the estimation models used to measure these metrics. 
Accrual-based earnings management is estimated through discretionary accruals using the 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) which gives the non-discretionary portion of total 
accruals. The model assumes that non-discretionary accruals are constant and therefore changes 
in accruals between periods are due to discretionary accruals. To reflect the changes in the firm 
and its environment between periods, the model uses the change in revenues adjusted by 
receivables and the change in gross property, plant and equipment. This model is chosen over 
the original Jones model (Jones 1991) because it controls for the changes in credit sales, which 
Dechow et al. (1995) argue are easier to manipulate than cash sales, resulting in a more reliable 
benchmark for accrual-based earnings management. To arrive at the discretionary portion, one 
must first establish total accruals for which Dechow et al. (1995) advise the following formula: 
𝑇𝐴𝑡 = (∆𝐶𝐴𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 + ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡)      (1) 
where 
TAt  = total accruals in year t 
ΔCAt  = change in current assets in year t 
ΔCLt  = change in current liabilities in year t 
ΔCasht  = change in cash and cash equivalents in year t 
ΔSTDt  = change in debt included in current liabilities in year t 
Dept  = depreciation and amortization expense in year t 
The modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) for non-discretionary accruals is: 
𝑇𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑡     (2) 
where 
At-1  = total assets in year t-1 (or lagged total assets) 
ΔREVt  = change in revenues in year t 
ΔRECt  = change in receivables in year t 
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PPEt  = gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
εt  = error term 
Once the two estimations above are available, discretionary accruals can be derived as the 
difference between total accruals and the non-discretionary portion accruals. The coefficients in 
the modified Jones model and in the models for sales manipulation and overproduction are all 
estimated separately for each top-level ICB industry code for greater accuracy. 
Sales manipulation is estimated by following Roychowdhury’s (2006) process of using a model 
for normal cash flows from operations developed by Dechow et al. (1998).  The model is: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3
∆𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡       (3) 
where 
CFOt  = cash flows from operations in year t 
St  = sales in year t 
ΔSt  = change in sales in year t 
The value for sales manipulation or abnormal operating cash flows is considered the difference 
between reported operating cash flows and normal operating cash flows derived from the model 
above. 
Overproduction is also estimated by following Roychowdhury’s (2006) process of using models 
developed by Dechow et al. (1998). It assumes normal production costs as: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 = 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡 + ∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡         (4) 
where 
PRODt  = production costs in year t 
COGSt  = cost of goods sold in year t 
ΔINVt  = change in inventory in year t 
The two models by Dechow et al. (1998) for normal COGS and normal inventory growth are: 
 32 
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡        (5) 
∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
∆𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3
∆𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡       (6) 
where 
ΔSt-1  = change in sales in year t-1 
By combining the two models for normal COGS (5) and normal inventory growth (6) according 
to the equation for assumed normal production costs (4), a final model can be defined: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3
∆𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼4
∆𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡      (7) 
The value for overproduction or abnormal production costs is considered the difference between 
reported production costs and normal production costs derived from the model above. 
In addition to discretionary accruals (DA), sales manipulation (SM), and overproduction (OP), 
I also use the sum of these three to represent total earnings management use (EM): 
𝐸𝑀
𝐴𝑡−1
=
𝐷𝐴
𝐴𝑡−1
+
𝑆𝑀
𝐴𝑡−1
+
𝑂𝑃
𝐴𝑡−1
          (8) 
In this thesis, measuring total earnings management can be used to monitor the total use of these 
methods in relation to analyst coverage. It is also useful because it may shed light on how the 
three methods are used in relation to each other. For example, if results show associations 
between coverage and the three methods but total earnings management use in not related, it 
may suggest that firms only alternate between these different options while reacting to coverage 
changes but the total amount of earnings manipulation remains roughly the same. 
4.2.2 Regression models 
The primary method used in this thesis to estimate the relationship between analyst coverage 
and earnings management use is an OLS regression. The basic structure of the OLS regression 
is: 
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|𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡| = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 + 𝜖  
where EarningsManagement refers to the proxy of earnings management and Coverage to the 
proxy of analyst coverage being used for that specific test. These proxies are explained in detail 
in Chapter 5.2 where the various regression results are shared. Controls is a vector of the control 
variables used in all regressions, their selection and qualities are further expanded upon in 
Chapter 4.3 along with other data-related disclosures. YearFixed and IndustryFixed refer to year 
and industry fixed effects which are used in all regressions. 
However, the OLS regression is not flawless because it does not control for the potential 
endogeneity between analyst coverage and earnings management. It is possible that if analyst 
coverage impacts a firm’s earnings management behaviour, then a firm’s earnings management 
behaviour may also impact an analyst’s decision to follow that firm. For example, Hong et al. 
(2014) found evidence that the two are simultaneously determined and thus analysts tend to 
follow firms that use less earnings management. To address this issue, I use a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression which utilises an instrumental variable that captures the exogenous 
variation in analyst coverage. The 2SLS results can then be compared to the OLS results for 
confirmation of their validity. This method is not used for tests that involve measuring the effects 
of change in coverage, whether numerical or directional, because the change analysis already 
incorporates the effect of time as a sort of instrument and thus the additional benefit of a 2SLS 
regression is limited. 
Yu (2008) and others have implemented the 2SLS test using an instrumental variable for 
expected coverage which is based on the change in brokerage house sizes over time. They use 
expected coverage to capture the variation in a firm’s analyst coverage which is not linked to its 
earnings management use but to the changes in the number of analysts employed by the 
brokerage firms that follow it. Unfortunately, I do not have such specific brokerage house data 
available, but I am able to construct a similar variable using market-wide analyst coverage data. 
This modification of expected coverage is based on the change in the market-wide average of 
analyst coverage between observation year t and benchmark year 0. This is then multiplied by 
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a firm’s coverage in benchmark year 0 to arrive at its expected coverage in observation year t. 
The equation is: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡/𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒0) ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖0 
where ExpectedCoverageit is the expected coverage of firm i in year t, MarketCoverage is the 
market-wide average of analyst coverage per covered firm and Coverageio is the analyst 
coverage of firm i in year 0. The benchmark year used here is 2011 because it is in the middle 
of the sample period, but more importantly because it provides the largest generatable sample 
size for expected coverage (1316 observations). Firms with zero coverage in the benchmark 
year are excluded as the equation does not facilitate their use. This modification of expected 
coverage assumes that any changes in the average analyst following among all covered firms is 
a result of increased or decreased analyst activity in the marketplace. Thus, it can be used to 
capture the variation in a firm’s analyst coverage that is caused by change in overall analyst 
activity within the marketplace and which is exogenous to that firm’s earnings management use. 
Using expected coverage as the instrumental variable in the 2SLS regressions, the two stages 
are: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒̂ = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 + 𝜖 
|𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡| = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒̂ + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 + 𝜖  
4.3 Data 
The empirical research in this thesis is based on two primary data points: analyst coverage data 
and financial data to measure earnings management. The data for analyst coverage is gathered 
from the IBES (Institutional Brokers' Estimate System) database, using the quantity of full-year 
EPS estimates. The financial data for measuring all three forms of earnings management is 
collected from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database, the Orbis databases and in some cases 
manually from annual reports when data is not available in the databases. 
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The original sample consists of 1875 firm-year observations from a period of 2005 to 2018. 
After removing ineligible financial firms such as banks and insurance companies (ICB codes 
8300-8500) as well as observations with incomplete data, and winsorizing the remaining data at 
0.5% and 95.5% to remove outliers, the final sample size is 1640 firm-year observations. Of 
these, 1567 have data for discretionary accruals (DA), 1622 for sales manipulation (SM), 1280 
for overproduction (OP), and 1251 for total earnings management (EM) which is simply the 
combination of the three methods. More specific industry and year distributions of each sub-
sample can be viewed in Appendix 1. 
Due to the wide variety in analyst coverage levels among firms, rather than using the raw 
number of analysts coverage this variable is measured on a logarithmic scale, by adding one to 
each analyst count and obtaining the natural logarithm of that value. This modification is 
especially valuable when researching the effects of change in coverage, as it analyses the data 
more in terms of ratios than differences which offers more equivalent values between firms on 
different ends of the coverage distribution. The logarithm of coverage is used in all regressions 
that utilise number of analysts as a variable, and it is also used on the expected coverage variable 
when running 2SLS tests. 
A value for earnings management is present as the dependant variable in all the regressions in 
this study. Even though the methods can be used to both increase and decrease a firm’s reported 
earnings, its role as a variable here is to show how much earnings management is being used. 
For this reason, the variables for earnings management are in all cases absolute values. When 
measuring change in earnings management, the value used is the change in the absolute value, 
meaning how the level of use has changed regardless of whether it is used to increase or decrease 
earnings. However, it may be important to also observe in which directions firms use earnings 
management, especially if it is heavily lopsided. For this reason, the regression results are 
presented in three groups: all firms, firms with positive or upwards management, and firms with 
negative or downwards management. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, firms have 
various incentives to manage earnings in both directions and presenting the results in this way 
can be used to monitor whether there is evidence of an uneven distribution.  
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There are five control variables used in this study, along with industry and year fixed effects. 
These variables are firm characteristics which may also impact earnings management and hence 
their effects are being controlled for. Market to book ratio is used to differentiate between 
growth and value firms, calculated as market value divided by total equity. Return on assets 
portrays profitability and is gathered from the Eikon database. Growth rate of assets is the 
change of total assets divided by lagged total assets, a measure of a firm’s growth rate. Cash 
flow volatility is the standard deviation of a firm’s cash flows over the entire sample period 
scaled by lagged total assets, representing a firm’s operational volatility during the sample 
period. Finally, leverage is total liabilities divided by total equity. Market value is used in the 
descriptive statistics due to its significance is describing the samples, however it is not used in 
the regressions due to a high degree of multicollinearity. 
Some of the tests involve measuring the effect of change in analyst coverage. In these tests the 
control variables are also used in the form of change between the observation and benchmark 
years rather than as values from the observation year. While there may be an argument for both, 
I have deemed the change more relevant in this context. I believe that using the change value 
offers the regression more data on what happened during the period of change, resulting in a 
more informed estimation of the effect of change in analyst coverage. 
  
 37 
5 Empirical results 
This chapter presents the findings of this study. It begins with descriptive statistics and 
correlation structures for the basic characteristics of the key variables, then transitions into the 
tests and shares their results. The tests are divided into three sections: comparing covered versus 
uncovered firms, measuring the impact of the level of coverage, and measuring the effects of 
three different types of change in coverage. More extensive discussion of these results and their 
implications will take place in Chapter 6. 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for each of the three sub-samples: discretionary accruals, 
sales manipulation, and overproduction. Sales manipulation has the highest firm-year 
observation count (1622), followed by discretionary accruals (1567) and overproduction (1280). 
The sub-samples are not the same size due to the different data points used to estimate the use 
of these methods, as well as industrial variation which can be seen more clearly in Appendix 1. 
All earnings management figures are presented as scaled by lagged total assets, according to the 
formulas utilised and described earlier in Chapter 4.2. The average company is covered by 
between 4 and 5 analysts and its market value is between 175 and 249 million euros, depending 
on the sample. Firms in the overproduction sub-sample are larger and use slightly more leverage 
than firms in the other samples. Overproduction is also used approximately three times as 
heavily as discretionary accruals and sales manipulation when scaled by total lagged assets. 
Table 2 describes the correlation structure of the key variables used in the regressions. It shows 
that the number of analysts covering a firm is negatively correlated with the absolute values of 
each of the earnings management metrics, overproduction less than the others. This study uses 
analyst coverage on a logarithmic scale. Expected coverage, the instrumental variable used in 
the 2SLS regressions and on a logarithmic scale, is highly correlated with actual analyst 
coverage but its correlations with the earnings management metrics are lower than those of 
actual coverage. Market value is only used to describe the samples and not as a control variable 
in regressions due to a high degree of multicollinearity. 
 38 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the three sub-samples 
This table describes the characteristics of the three sub-samples. Q1 and Q3 refer to values at the first and third quartile, 
respectively. 
 
Discretionary accruals N Q1 Mean Median Q3 St. dev.
Discretionary accruals 1567 -0.051 -0.011 -0.008 0.027 0.08
Discretionary accruals, absolute 1567 0.017 0.058 0.040 0.076 0.06
Number of analysts 1567 1.00 6.71 4.00 10.00 7.60
Market value (EUR million) 1567 40 1547 185 845 5224
Market-book ratio 1567 1.06 2.25 1.70 2.92 11.78
Return on assets 1567 0.15 2.22 4.01 7.90 15.14
Growth rate of assets 1567 -0.05 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.46
Cash flow volatility 1567 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.09
Leverage 1567 0.76 1.57 1.24 1.80 10.52
Sales manipulation N Q1 Mean Median Q3 St. dev.
Sales manipulation 1622 -0.038 0.008 0.009 0.058 0.10
Sales manipulation, absolute 1622 0.021 0.069 0.048 0.097 0.07
Number of analysts 1622 1.00 6.59 4.00 10.00 7.56
Market value (EUR million) 1622 39 1502 175 810 5141
Market-book ratio 1622 1.05 2.39 1.70 2.88 8.74
Return on assets 1622 0.21 2.71 4.04 7.96 13.57
Growth rate of assets 1622 -0.05 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.47
Cash flow volatility 1622 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.09
Leverage 1622 0.75 1.60 1.23 1.81 10.14
Overproduction N Q1 Mean Median Q3 St. dev.
Overproduction 1280 -0.176 -0.029 -0.046 0.113 0.25
Overproduction, absolute 1280 0.072 0.191 0.148 0.264 0.16
Number of analysts 1280 1.00 7.53 5.00 11.00 7.86
Market value (EUR million) 1280 52 1849 249 1135 5734
Market-book ratio 1280 1.07 2.20 1.72 2.80 2.44
Return on assets 1280 0.42 2.94 4.04 7.86 13.63
Growth rate of assets 1280 -0.05 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.31
Cash flow volatility 1280 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.08
Leverage 1280 0.85 1.46 1.32 1.90 3.57
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Table 2. Correlation structure of key variables for the three sub-samples 
 
Table 3 shows how the descriptive statistics vary between different levels of analyst coverage. 
This study uses the absolute values of earnings management in regressions since the main 
purpose is to study the extent of use rather than direction. For use of discretionary accruals, there 
is a downward trend as coverage increases. A similar but weaker trend is visible for sales 
manipulation, while overproduction shows a slight upward trend until coverage surpasses 10 
analysts, at which point its use drops significantly. Firms with more coverage are generally 
larger and they also show higher returns on assets. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Number of analysts (log) 1.000
2 Discretionary accruals, absolute -0.202 1.000
3 Discretionary accruals -0.018 -0.104 1.000
4 Market-book ratio 0.016 0.038 0.060 1.000
5 Return on assets 0.214 -0.193 0.114 0.071 1.000
6 Growth rate of assets -0.053 0.199 0.014 0.043 0.053 1.000
7 Cash flow volatility -0.354 0.255 0.051 0.059 -0.244 0.349 1.000
8 Leverage 0.000 0.044 0.067 0.838 -0.006 0.019 0.058 1.000
9 Expected coverage (log) 0.930 -0.171 -0.003 -0.009 0.243 -0.028 -0.288 -0.028 1.000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Number of analysts (log) 1.000
2 Sales manipulation, absolute -0.177 1.000
3 Sales manipulation 0.072 -0.027 1.000
4 Market-book ratio 0.008 0.095 -0.017 1.000
5 Return on assets 0.209 -0.103 0.368 0.031 1.000
6 Growth rate of assets -0.077 0.209 -0.084 0.027 0.052 1.000
7 Cash flow volatility -0.359 0.349 -0.083 0.099 -0.136 0.326 1.000
8 Leverage -0.003 0.024 -0.085 0.956 -0.025 0.018 0.065 1.000
9 Expected coverage (log) 0.927 -0.147 0.095 -0.005 0.223 -0.020 -0.304 -0.027 1.000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Number of analysts (log) 1.000
2 Overproduction, absolute -0.092 1.000
3 Overproduction 0.081 -0.049 1.000
4 Market-book ratio 0.123 0.094 -0.083 1.000
5 Return on assets 0.211 0.095 -0.086 0.228 1.000
6 Growth rate of assets -0.025 0.162 0.042 0.084 0.042 1.000
7 Cash flow volatility -0.344 0.054 -0.022 0.081 -0.146 0.256 1.000
8 Leverage 0.027 -0.014 0.021 0.526 0.008 0.013 -0.038 1.000
9 Expected coverage (log) 0.932 -0.071 0.103 0.123 0.197 0.011 -0.254 0.022 1.000
Discretionary accruals
Sales manipulation
Overproduction
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of sub-samples based on the level of analyst coverage 
This table describes the sub-samples based on size of analyst coverage. It divides each sample into groups by their size of 
coverage and presents medians and means of absolute use of the respective earnings management method, market value, and 
return on assets for each group along with the size of the group. 
 
5.2 Analyst coverage and earnings management use 
The results in this chapter focus on how the quantity of analyst coverage affects a company’s 
use of earnings management. The analysis is divided into three parts, first looking at a simple 
division between covered and uncovered firms, then using the actual level of coverage for more 
specific insight, and finally examining the effects of change in the level of coverage. Regression 
results for covered versus uncovered firms, level of coverage, and numeric change in coverage 
are estimated using three categories: all firms, firms with positive or upwards earnings 
management, and firms with negative or downwards earnings management. This is done in order 
to identify whether the results for all firms are being distorted by either one of the directions 
perhaps due to the various incentives described earlier in Chapter 2.2. 
As mentioned earlier, I have also added an additional proxy to the regressions which represents 
total earnings management. This is the sum of discretionary accruals, sales manipulation and 
overproduction, and reflects a firm’s total use of earnings management at least to the extent of 
the metrics measured in this study. This offers an additional fourth measure which can be used 
Coverage
(analysts)
Abs_DA
Market 
value
ROA
N
(1567)
Abs_SM
Market 
value
ROA
N
(1622)
Abs_OP
Market 
value
ROA
N
(1280)
Median 0.056 20.8 2.62 260 0.054 20.5 2.64 271 0.140 20.3 2.59 170
Mean 0.078 48.7 -3.49 0.084 47.5 -2.27 0.181 47.7 -1.96
Median 0.038 294.7 4.16 1307 0.046 271.6 4.22 1351 0.152 366.2 4.22 1110
Mean 0.054 1844.9 3.36 0.066 1793.6 3.70 0.193 2124.9 3.69
Median 0.051 26.0 1.56 226 0.056 28.3 2.14 249 0.169 28.1 1.53 167
Mean 0.074 60.4 -1.82 0.079 59.8 -0.63 0.213 67.8 -1.67
Median 0.037 123.3 4.43 431 0.052 119.4 4.43 441 0.169 126.8 3.89 339
Mean 0.056 488.6 3.45 0.071 479.7 3.83 0.214 571.3 3.29
Median 0.038 423.8 4.66 279 0.051 422.7 4.66 285 0.180 445.8 4.66 253
Mean 0.050 946.8 4.51 0.070 934.4 4.84 0.213 1015.4 5.01
Median 0.033 2127.2 4.63 371 0.033 2119.7 4.64 376 0.119 2348.9 4.77 351
Mean 0.043 5183.1 5.54 0.049 5133.9 5.55 0.148 5403.8 5.67
Sales manipulation (SM) Overproduction (OP)
0
> 0
1
2-5
6-10
> 10
Discretionary accruals (DA)
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to better understand the earnings management use. It may also offer some supplementary 
information on the use of the three methods in relation to each other. 
5.2.1 Covered versus uncovered firms 
The first part of analysis looks at how the earnings management behaviour of firms varies 
depending on whether a company is or is not followed by analysts. Using a dummy variable for 
coverage, 1 for covered and 0 for uncovered, the OLS results in Table 4 show that covered firms 
exhibit lower use of discretionary accruals compared to uncovered firms. The result is reflected 
in firms with both positive and negative discretionary accruals, suggesting that it is a balance 
effect. Overall, firms with coverage use more overproduction than those without coverage 
however there is a severe divide between firms with positive and negative overproduction. Firms 
with positive overproduction use it less, whereas those with negative overproduction use it more. 
The use of sales manipulation as well as the total earnings management from all three methods 
combined do not present significant results with regards to having coverage or not. By 
comparing the regression results to the median (mean) values of discretionary accruals and 
overproduction in the summary statistics, it can be derived that covered firms use approximately 
40% (28%) less discretionary accruals and 20% (15%) more overproduction than uncovered 
firms. Overall, being covered by analysts appears to have a significant effect on which methods 
of earnings management firms prefer to use. 
Next, I use the 2SLS test with expected coverage presented earlier in Chapter 4.2.2 to address 
the possible endogeneity between analyst coverage and earnings management. Comparing the 
significant OLS results to corresponding 2SLS coefficients in Table 5 shows that their signs are 
consistent, with one exception being firms who decreased earnings through overproduction. The 
result for discretionary accruals is significant and negative also in the 2SLS regression, also 
suggesting robust results. Interestingly, sales manipulation shows significant results in the 2SLS 
regression that are not present in the OLS regression, for both positive and negative use with 
opposite directions of effect. 
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Table 4. Covered versus uncovered firms, OLS regression results 
The dependent variables are the absolute values of the respective earnings management metrics. The coverage dummy is 0 for 
uncovered firms and 1 for covered firms. Positive and negative refer to firms with either positive or negative earnings 
management. T-statistics in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 
Table 5. Covered and uncovered firms, 2SLS regression results 
The dependent variables are the absolute values of the respective earnings management metrics. The instrumental variable is 
expected coverage on a logarithmic scale. The coverage dummy is 0 for uncovered firms and 1 for covered firms. Positive and 
negative refer to firms with either positive or negative earnings management. T-statistics in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
All firms Positive Negative All firms Positive Negative All firms Positive Negative All firms Positive Negative
Intercept 0.020 0.016 0.018 0.033** 0.042** -0.012 0.017 0.072 -0.025 0.066 0.054 0.048
(1.26) (0.72) (0.85) (2.03) (2.03) (-0.50) (0.40) (1.19) (-0.45) (1.29) (0.67) (0.69)
Coverage dummy -0.016*** -0.014** -0.012** 0.002 -0.004 0.009 0.029** -0.047** 0.047*** 0.011 0.004 0.002
(-3.67) (-2.23) (-2.13) (0.53) (-0.72) (1.35) (2.21) (-2.10) (2.92) (0.71) (0.13) (0.12)
Market to book ratio 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.001 0.003 -0.005 0.013*** 0.010*** -0.001 0.023***
(0.44) (-0.92) (1.44) (8.98) (9.62) (0.69) (1.14) (-1.54) (3.94) (3.36) (-0.21) (5.79)
Return on assets -0.001*** -0.000** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.001** 0.001*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(-6.24) (-2.12) (-7.31) (-4.58) (1.13) (-8.91) (2.17) (2.78) (-0.23) (-1.38) (-0.29) (-1.24)
Growth rate of assets 0.023*** 0.056*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.023*** 0.072*** 0.097*** 0.064*** 0.142*** 0.196*** 0.087***
(6.68) (7.88) (4.51) (5.08) (2.59) (4.87) (5.03) (4.91) (3.06) (6.78) (6.74) (2.76)
Cash flow volatility 0.089*** 0.179*** 0.017 0.186*** 0.155*** 0.188*** 0.018 -0.148 0.074 0.251*** 0.226 0.270***
(4.42) (6.22) (0.58) (9.29) (6.30) (5.94) (0.32) (-1.48) (1.11) (3.48) (1.53) (3.30)
Leverage 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.002 -0.011***
(0.50) (1.13) (-1.32) (-8.84) (-9.40) (-0.63) (-1.01) (0.88) (-3.12) (-2.97) (0.53) (-5.34)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of observations 1567 686 881 1622 893 729 1280 523 757 1251 534 717
Adjusted R² 0.132 0.195 0.144 0.228 0.258 0.300 0.188 0.314 0.187 0.221 0.255 0.232
Discretionary accruals (DA) Sales manipulation (SM) Overproduction (OP) Earnings management (EM)
All firms Positive Negative All firms Positive Negative All firms Positive Negative All firms Positive Negative
Intercept 0.074*** 0.028 0.105*** 0.040*** 0.062*** -0.017 0.232*** 0.437*** 0.163*** 0.315*** 0.477*** 0.244***
(5.34) (1.51) (5.26) (2.84) (4.14) (-0.61) (5.33) (5.59) (3.37) (6.04) (5.44) (4.03)
Coverage dummy -0.023* -0.013 -0.041** -0.006 -0.038*** 0.043* 0.028 -0.003 -0.009 0.009 0.006 -0.035
(-1.85) (-0.83) (-2.08) (-0.45) (-2.65) (1.70) (0.73) (-0.04) (-0.20) (0.20) (0.09) (-0.61)
Market to book ratio -0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.005*** 0.011*** -0.003** 0.003 -0.008** 0.017*** 0.007** -0.008 0.026***
(-0.32) (-1.2) (1.36) (6.46) (9.25) (-2.32) (1.06) (-2.18) (4.60) (2.23) (-1.59) (6.11)
Return on assets -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
(-5.12) (-1.23) (-5.37) (-3.02) (0.94) (-7.72) (0.79) (0.63) (-0.13) (-0.52) (-0.00) (-0.69)
Growth rate of assets 0.009** 0.050*** 0.007 0.009* 0.009 0.016** 0.079*** 0.105*** 0.048 0.113*** 0.149*** 0.065
(2.29) (6.48) (1.32) (1.18) (1.43) (2.15) (4.32) (4.61) (1.59) (4.83) (4.96) (1.65)
Cash flow volatility 0.228*** 0.375*** 0.149*** 0.277*** 0.228*** 0.339*** -0.016 -0.145 0.078 0.629*** 0.510** 0.784***
(7.14) (8.36) (3.30) (9.35) (6.05) (7.38) (-0.17) (-0.96) (0.62) (4.79) (2.02) (5.25)
Leverage 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.004*** -0.005*** 0.003** -0.004 0.004 -0.009*** -0.004 0.004 -0.014***
(0.59) (1.21) (1.10) (-6.39) (-4.79) (2.19) (-1.60) (1.20) (-3.01) (-1.37) (0.85) (-3.89)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of observations 1283 566 717 1311 735 576 1120 447 673 1102 469 633
Adjusted R² 0.176 0.289 0.160 0.247 0.298 0.311 0.166 0.320 0.159 0.225 0.262 0.264
Discretionary accruals (DA) Sales manipulation (SM) Overproduction (OP) Earnings management (EM)
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5.2.2 Level of analyst coverage 
The second part of analysis examines how the level of analyst coverage affects earnings 
management use. It measures analyst coverage by the number of analysts covering a firm in a 
specific year on a logarithmic scale. The OLS results in Table 6 show that analyst coverage and 
the use of discretionary accruals have a significant negative association, meaning greater 
coverage is linked to less use of discretionary accruals. The use of other methods or the 
combined level of earnings management do not show significant results, only in some of the 
sub-samples for either positive or negative use. Some of the other variables used in the 
regression also show significant relations to overall earnings management use. Higher valuation, 
growth rate, and cash flow volatility appear to indicate a higher level of earnings management 
across the board, whereas higher leverage shows a negative association. 
Table 6. Level of analyst coverage, OLS regression results 
The dependent variables are the absolute values of the respective earnings management metrics. Analyst coverage is a firm’s 
analyst following on a logarithmic scale. Positive and negative refer to firms with either positive or negative earnings 
management use. T-statistics in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 
In Table 7, the 2SLS results using expected coverage as the instrument also show a significant 
negative association between analyst coverage and discretionary accrual use. This is consistent 
with the OLS results, however the 2SLS coefficients are smaller. For sales manipulation, firms 
All firms Positive Negative All firms Positive Negative All firms Positive Negative All firms Positive Negative
Intercept 0.029* 0.020 0.032 0.042** 0.054*** -0.007 0.043 0.065 0.017 0.104** 0.079 0.097
(1.79) (0.86) (1.46) (2.50) (2.61) (-0.25) (1.02) (1.05) (0.30) (1.98) (0.99) (1.36)
Analyst coverage -0.008*** -0.006** -0.008*** -0.002 -0.005** 0.001 0.000 -0.012* -0.000 -0.008 -0.006 -0.016**
(-4.54) (-2.23) (-3.51) (-1.11) (-2.54) (0.38) (0.06) (-1.70) (-0.04) (-1.40) (-0.68) (-2.07)
Market to book ratio 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.001 0.003 -0.005 0.014*** 0.011*** -0.000 0.025***
(0.63) (-0.78) (1.55) (9.06) (9.97) (0.68) (1.44) (-1.50) (4.41) (3.67) (-0.07) (6.20)
Return on assets -0.001*** -0.000** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.001** 0.001*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(-5.90) (-2.02) (-6.92) (-4.28) (1.28) (-8.65) (2.25) (2.90) (-0.19) (-0.99) (-0.18) (-0.80)
Growth rate of assets 0.023*** 0.055*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.023*** 0.075*** 0.091*** 0.065*** 0.143*** 0.196*** 0.087***
(6.63) (7.76) (4.67) (5.17) (2.61) (4.98) (5.22) (4.70) (3.10) (6.83) (6.78) (2.77)
Cash flow volatility 0.080*** 0.178*** -0.001 0.175*** 0.137*** 0.181*** -0.017 -0.114 0.032 0.204*** 0.183 0.217***
(3.91) (6.15) (-0.03) (8.61) (5.48) (5.64) (-0.31) (-1.18) (0.46) (2.78) (1.26) (2.59)
Leverage 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.002 -0.012***
(0.28) (0.98) (-1.41) (-8.91) (-9.61) (-0.60) (-1.11) (0.84) (-3.28) (-3.12) (0.46) (-5.57)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of observations 1567 686 881 1622 893 729 1280 523 757 1251 534 717
Adjusted R² 0.136 0.195 0.151 0.229 0.263 0.298 0.184 0.312 0.178 0.222 0.256 0.237
Discretionary accruals (DA) Sales manipulation (SM) Overproduction (OP) Earnings management (EM)
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that use it to increase earnings show a significant negative association with analyst coverage 
while those that use it to decrease earnings show a significant positive association. The result 
for firms that increase earnings is highly significant, which also shows in the OLS results in 
Table 6. Due to the strength and consistency of this result in both the OLS and 2SLS regressions, 
this may be a phenomenon worth noticing. This greater significance of 2SLS estimates over 
OLS estimates for sales manipulation was also the case when comparing covered versus 
uncovered firms. 
Table 7. Level of analyst coverage, 2SLS regression results 
The dependent variables are the absolute values of the respective earnings management metrics. Analyst coverage is a firm’s 
analyst following on a logarithmic scale. The instrumental variable is expected coverage on a logarithmic scale. Positive and 
negative refer to firms with either positive or negative earnings management. T-statistics in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
5.2.3 Change in analyst coverage 
Next, I look at how change in coverage affects the use of earnings management. Since there are 
various ways in which change in analyst coverage can be expressed, I use three different 
methods for a broader understanding of the effects. The first method uses the numerical change 
in a firm’s analyst coverage on a logarithmic scale as the explanatory variable and the change 
in the absolute value of earnings management use as the dependant variable. Here I use two 
All firms Positive Negative All firms Positive Negative All firms Positive Negative All firms Positive Negative
Intercept 0.058*** 0.018* 0.078*** 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.018 0.253*** 0.435*** 0.157*** 0.322*** 0.481*** 0.221***
(7.52) (1.74) (7.24) (4.59) (4.16) (1.53) (10.67) (11.70) (5.15) (11.23) (10.10) (6.25)
Analyst coverage -0.004* -0.002 -0.006** -0.001 -0.006*** 0.006* 0.004 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.006
(-1.85) (-0.82) (-2.11) (-0.45) (-2.71) (1.74) (0.73) (-0.04) (-0.20) (0.20) (0.09) (-0.61)
Market to book ratio -0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.005*** 0.010*** -0.004*** 0.003 -0.008** 0.017*** 0.007** -0.008 0.026***
(-0.28) -1.22 (1.28) (6.45) (9.62) (-2.93) (1.19) (-2.15) (4.84) (2.27) (-1.60) (6.26)
Return on assets -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
(-5.36) (-1.16) (-6.18) (-3.05) (1.53) (-8.37) (0.77) (0.70) (-0.09) (-0.51) (0.01) (-0.74)
Growth rate of assets 0.008** 0.049*** 0.006 0.009* 0.010* 0.019*** 0.080*** 0.105*** 0.048 0.113*** 0.149*** 0.065*
(2.13) (6.41) (1.24) (1.87) (1.68) (2.67) (4.40) (4.66) (1.59) (4.84) (5.04) (1.66)
Cash flow volatility 0.237*** 0.386*** 0.148*** 0.280*** 0.240*** 0.314*** -0.036 -0.141 0.080 0.624*** 0.502** 0.790***
(7.87) (9.92) (3.30) (10.37) (6.76) (8.15) (-0.43) (-1.27) (0.64) (5.18) (-2.39) (5.44)
Leverage 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.004*** -0.006*** 0.003*** -0.004 0.004 -0.009*** -0.004 0.003 -0.014***
(0.51) (1.22) (0.80) (-6.37) (-4.93) (2.85) (-1.59) (1.19) (-3.01) (-1.35) (0.85) (-3.95)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of observations 1283 566 717 1311 735 576 1120 447 673 1102 469 633
Adjusted R² 0.176 0.283 0.183 0.247 0.329 0.340 0.163 0.320 0.162 0.224 0.262 0.271
Discretionary accruals (DA) Sales manipulation (SM) Overproduction (OP) Earnings management (EM)
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years as the timeframe for change since it is unlikely that most firms adjust their earnings 
management behaviour based on single-year coverage changes. I also tested one- and three-year 
changes but two years appeared to offer the strongest results. On a side note, single-year changes 
are likely to be the significant alternative for firms who experience a complete loss or gain of 
coverage (one to zero, or zero to one analysts following them), due to which I attempt to measure 
this in one of the subsequent experiments. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 4.3, all the control 
variables also represent change rather than values. In addition, 2SLS regressions are not used in 
these tests since the presence of change analysis already mitigates endogeneity. 
Table 8 shows the OLS regression results of the first experiment, numerical change in analyst 
coverage. The sample size is decreases by roughly a third due to the requirement of having a 
two-year change available. Discretionary accruals show a significant negative association with 
coverage change, like the previous tests of coverage as a dummy and level of coverage, 
especially among firms with negative discretionary accruals. Positive use of both sales 
manipulation and total earnings management show significant positive associations with change 
of coverage. 
Table 8. Numerical change in analyst coverage, OLS regression results 
The dependent variables are the two-year changes in the absolute values of the respective earnings management metrics. 
Analyst coverage is a firm’s two-year change in analyst following on a logarithmic scale. Positive and negative refer to firms 
with either positive or negative earnings management. T-statistics in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
All firms Positive Negative All firms Positive Negative All firms Positive Negative All firms Positive Negative
Intercept 0.002 0.032 -0.003 0.007 -0.009 0.029 0.008 -0.026 0.015 0.037 0.024 0.066
(0.09) (0.91) (-0.09) (0.28) (-0.30) (0.74) (0.19) (-0.42) (0.29) (0.63) (0.32) (0.65)
Analyst coverage -0.012** -0.009 -0.018** 0.007 0.016** -0.002 0.016 0.027 0.014 0.008 0.060** -0.012
(-1.99) (-1.01) (-2.10) (1.18) (2.02) (-0.20) (1.38) (1.27) (1.05) (0.48) (2.03) (-0.58)
Market to book ratio -0.001*** -0.002 -0.002*** 0.002 0.004* -0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.010** 0.001 -0.005 0.005
(-2.75) (-0.82) (-2.64) (1.36) (1.94) (-1.41) (0.65) (-0.18) (2.08) (0.20) (-0.67) (1.12)
Return on assets -0.001*** 0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002** 0.001** -0.001 -0.004** 0.000
(-3.19) (2.03) (-4.04) (-3.93) (1.03) (-6.47) (1.22) (-2.03) (2.08) (-1.07) (-2.35) (0.42)
Growth rate of assets 0.013** 0.036*** 0.003 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.083*** 0.154*** 0.005 0.126*** 0.210*** 0.045
(2.15) (4.17) (0.32) (3.54) (2.63) (2.60) (6.32) (7.51) (0.31) (5.78) (6.01) (1.58)
Cash flow volatility 0.062 0.075 0.035 0.155*** 0.105* 0.205** 0.005 -0.541** 0.232** 0.441** 0.798 0.367*
(1.07) (0.93) (0.43) (2.91) (1.77) (2.14) (0.05) (-2.38) (2.35) (2.25) (1.64) (1.81)
Leverage 0.004*** 0.003** 0.006*** -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.011* -0.005
(3.33) (2.18) (-2.87) (-1.30) (0.32) (0.62) (-0.83) (0.55) (-0.60) (0.68) (1.92) (-1.09)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of observations 808 350 458 837 462 375 701 312 389 681 311 370
Adjusted R² 0.052 0.094 0.078 0.043 0.031 0.149 0.084 0.181 0.066 0.070 0.171 0.002
2 year change
Discretionary accruals (DA) Sales manipulation (SM) Overproduction (OP) Earnings management (EM)
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The second method for measuring change also looks at two-year changes but it treats coverage 
change only in terms of increase or decrease rather than on a numerical scale. Using dummy 
variables for increase and decrease, this method simply shows what effect the direction of 
change has on a firm’s earnings management behaviour, completely ignoring the magnitude of 
change. In this test the table includes two columns for each earnings management metric rather 
than three, one describing the effects of increased coverage and the other for decreased coverage. 
For example, in the Increased columns of Table 9 the dummy variable is given 1 for observations 
in which there was a two-year increase in coverage and 0 for those in which coverage decreased 
or remained the same. In the Decreased columns, the dummy variable is 1 for observations in 
which there was a two-year decrease in coverage and 0 for those in which coverage increased 
or remained the same. The table now also includes an additional row below number of 
observations which discloses the number of observations that were assigned value 1. This is 
important for seeing whether the number of applicable observations is large enough to draw 
reliable conclusions. 
Table 9. Increase and decrease in coverage, OLS regression results 
The dependent variables are the two-year changes in the absolute values of the respective earnings management metrics. In 
the Increased columns, Coverage change dummy is 1 for firms with a two-year increase in coverage, and 0 for all other 
observations. In the Decreased columns, Coverage change dummy is 1 for firms with a two-year decrease in coverage, and 0 
for all other observations. T-statistics in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level is indicated by *, **, 
and ***, respectively. 
 
Increased Decreased Increased Decreased Increased Decreased Increased Decreased
Intercept 0.016 0.009 0.018 0.021 0.007 0.019 0.052 0.055
(0.76) (0.44) (0.91) (1.07) (0.24) (0.62) (1.13) (1.19)
Coverage change -0.013*** 0.007 0.006 -0.003 0.021*** -0.016** 0.003 -0.012
dummy (-2.78) (1.43) (1.31) (-0.59) (2.67) (-2.13) (0.25) (-1.11)
Market to book ratio -0.000* -0.000 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(-1.67) (-1.56) (2.48) (2.49) (0.62) (0.59) (0.76) (0.74)
Return on assets -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** -0.001 -0.001
(-3.49) (-3.46) (-5.01) (-5.01) (2.06) (2.17) (-1.28) (-1.30)
Growth rate of assets 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.121*** 0.122***
(7.68) (7.61) (6.27) (6.29) (5.98) (6.13) (7.49) (7.55)
Cash flow volatility -0.041 -0.034 0.170*** 0.167*** 0.122* 0.102 0.226 0.228
(-1.00) (-0.83) (4.67) (4.60) (1.75) (1.48) (1.59) (1.61)
Leverage 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002* -0.002* -0.002 -0.002
(2.79) (2.67) (-3.04) (-3.05) (-1.78) (-1.76) (-0.95) (-0.92)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of observations 1246 1246 1297 1297 1036 1036 1008 1008
# of dummy = 1 352 456 370 467 296 405 286 395
Adjusted R² 0.078 0.074 0.093 0.092 0.079 0.077 0.063 0.064
2 year change
Discretionary accruals (DA) Sales manipulation (SM) Overproduction (OP) Earnings management (EM)
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Table 9 shows the OLS regression results for two-year increase and decrease in coverage. Firms 
that experience an increase in coverage decrease their use of discretionary accruals and increase 
use of overproduction in comparison to other firms. A decrease in coverage on the other hand 
is associated with a decrease of overproduction compared to other firms, reflecting a rather 
meaningful overall result for overproduction. 
The third method for measuring change is like the previous increase and decrease test but only 
looks at the special case of complete gain or loss of coverage, meaning going from zero to one 
or one to zero in analyst following. The timeframe used here is only one year because the change 
in coverage at this level can be considered quite significant and therefore it is realistic to expect 
the potential behavioural reaction to be near immediate. The test uses dummy variables in the 
same way as Increased and Decreased were used in Table 9, but now the two columns in use are 
labelled Gained and Lost, identifying firms who have experienced a complete gain or complete 
loss coverage rather than any level of increase or decrease. 
It is important to note that while the number of total observations in this test is adequate and 
comparable to all the other tests, the number of observations that are assigned value 1 for 
complete gain or loss of coverage is very limited as this is a relatively rare occasion at the scale 
of an entire marketplace. Simply put, for a firm to be assigned the value 1 it must have at some 
point in the sample period had zero analyst coverage which only applies to very few firms. Table 
10 shows the OLS regression results for this test along with observation data, and the share of 
observations with dummy variable as 1 range from about 2.3% to 3.2%. This may impact the 
reliability of these results and highlights the need for caution when discussing their implications. 
As for the actual regression results, Table 10 shows that firms that gain initial coverage decrease 
their use of discretionary accruals and increase their use of overproduction following the 
coverage change compared to other firms. This is consistent with what was monitored for a 
general increase and decrease of coverage, however the magnitude here is greater. There is also 
a less significant result for increased use of overall earnings management among firms who lose 
all coverage. 
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Table 10. Complete gain and loss of coverage, OLS regression results 
The dependent variables are the one-year changes in the absolute values of the respective earnings management metrics. In 
the Gained columns, Coverage change dummy is 1 for firms who gain coverage, and 0 for all other observations. In the Lost 
columns, Coverage change dummy is 1 for firms who lose coverage, and 0 for all other observations T-statistics in 
parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Overall, these three different processes for testing the effects of change in coverage show mostly 
consistent results indicating a significant negative association with discretionary accrual and a 
positive but not quite as extensive association with overproduction. Sales manipulation and total 
earnings management do not indicate any significant results. These findings are also consistent 
with the previous tests of coverage as a dummy and level of coverage. 
 
  
Gained Lost Gained Lost Gained Lost Gained Lost
Intercept 0.011 0.012 0.006 0.007 -0.002 -0.003 0.018 0.018
(0.59) (0.63) (0.36) (0.37) (-0.06) (-0.11) (0.46) (0.45)
Coverage change -0.025** 0.009 0.001 0.015 0.054*** 0.015 0.001 0.050*
dummy (-2.25) (0.80) (0.06) (1.38) (2.92) (0.83) (0.05) (1.73)
Market to book ratio -0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.002** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(-0.12) (0.22) (2.19) (2.27) (3.38) (3.40) (2.71) (2.83)
Return on assets -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001* -0.001*
(-3.21) (-3.29) (-3.56) (-3.67) (1.27) (1.29) (-1.96) (-1.90)
Growth rate of assets 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.063*** 0.067*** 0.155*** 0.155***
(7.60) (7.45) (5.38) (5.48) (7.56) (8.05) (10.41) (10.51)
Cash flow volatility -0.015 -0.009 0.113** 0.109** -0.019 -0.053 0.155 0.105
(-0.29) (-0.17) (2.51) (2.44) (-0.26) (-0.71) (0.68) (0.58)
Leverage 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.001** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(1.40) (1.13) (-2.05) (-2.14) (-3.76) (-3.77) (-2.69) (-2.82)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of observations 1369 1369 1451 1451 1150 1150 1120 1120
# of dummy = 1 44 38 47 42 28 28 26 26
Adjusted R² 0.084 0.081 0.055 0.056 0.084 0.077 0.099 0.101
1 year change
Discretionary accruals (DA) Sales manipulation (SM) Overproduction (OP) Earnings management (EM)
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6 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to learn how the presence of analysts affects earnings management 
behaviour in Finnish listed companies. This chapter takes a closer look at the empirical findings 
and how they fit into the context of prior research, what their significance and impact are on 
both a practical and academic level, and what type of limitations are present in the results and 
study overall. 
The most robust finding is a significant negative association between analyst coverage and the 
use of discretionary accruals. There is strong evidence of this across all the different tests, both 
when comparing covered firms to uncovered firms as well as when measuring level of coverage 
and changes in coverage. In practice, the results mean that firms with more analyst coverage use 
less discretionary accruals while firms with less coverage use them more, and the greater the 
changes in coverage the greater the reverse effects on discretionary accrual use are. There is also 
evidence of this negative association when monitoring initial increases in coverage from zero to 
one analyst, but no significant effect is found among firms that lose all coverage. However, 
these two results are based on a limited sample size and thus require further research for 
verification.  
The negative association between coverage and discretionary accrual use reiterates the findings 
of prior research on the topic, such as the foundational study by Yu (2008) which used data from 
US companies. However, Degeorge et al (2013) included Finland in their study which analysed 
how countries at different levels of financial development differ in the association between 
coverage and discretionary accrual use, listing Finland in group of least developed. The study 
concluded that greater analyst coverage resulted in less accrual-based earnings management 
activity, but only in countries with high financial development. In Finland, according to their 
results, covered firms use more discretionary accruals than uncovered firms and the difference 
between these two groups was in fact the largest among all the recorded countries. This result 
is opposite to my findings despite the use of similar methods, which may be explained by the 
smaller sample of only 203 observations and an earlier data period of 1994 to 2002 used in the 
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Degeorge et al (2013) study. Based on my findings, discretionary accrual use in Finland is more 
in line with the group of countries listed in the study as having higher financial development. 
The results for overproduction are interesting because a positive association with analyst 
coverage exists but it only appears in tests that utilize dummy variables rather than variables 
that consider coverage on a numeric scale. For example, the results show that covered firms use 
more overproduction than uncovered firms, however using the level of coverage as a variable 
instead does not show any significant link to the use of overproduction. Similarly, the tests 
indicate that firms that experience any level of increase in coverage also increase their use of 
overproduction while any level of decrease in coverage is associated with a decrease in its use. 
However, when using the actual levels of change rather than dummy variables for any increase 
or decrease, the results show no significant associations.  
Some indication of this same phenomenon can also be seen in Table 3 which simply outlines 
the average uses for each earnings management method by level of analyst coverage. It shows 
a growing use of overproduction as coverage moves from 0 towards 10 analysts, at which point 
the median level of use drops dramatically for firms followed by 10 or more analysts. Perhaps 
the association with level of coverage is only present among firms of certain size or level of 
analyst following or it is more industry-specific, but this question among others with regards to 
the above findings clearly require more specific analysis.  
Overproduction has been found to associate positively with analyst coverage in prior research 
as well, such as by Sun & Liu (2016). They used the number of analysts as an explanatory 
variable and did in fact find a significant association, however they did not test simply covered 
versus uncovered firms which was determined relevant in this thesis. Another noteworthy 
observation regarding my results is that the effects of overproduction and discretionary accrual 
use in the result-producing dummy variable tests appear systematically opposite to each other. 
However, the tests used in this thesis are inadequate to make further conclusions regarding any 
possible relationship between these two methods of earnings management. Irani & Oesch (2016) 
recorded some evidence of simultaneous opposite changes in the use of discretionary accruals 
and real earnings management in reaction to coverage changes which could be a starting point 
for further research into this finding. 
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Of the three earnings management methods measured in this study, sales manipulation 
demonstrates the least meaningful results in relation to analyst coverage. In fact, there is no 
indication of any association when using all eligible firm-year observations to compare covered 
and uncovered firms or to measure effects of coverage level and change in coverage. However, 
there are two noticeable trends that are worth pointing out. First, the only significant results are 
found when observations are divided into two groups based on the direction in which sales 
manipulation is used to manage earnings, with most results occurring among firms with upwards 
management. Additionally, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions offer more 
significant results than the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression which is unusual and 
contrary to the results for discretionary accruals and overproduction.  
Prior research on analyst coverage and sales manipulation is slightly inconclusive, though most 
results such as Sun & Liu (2016) and Irani & Oesch (2016) point towards a positive association 
between the two. My results specifically among firms with upwards sales manipulation suggest 
that covered firms may use less sales manipulation and that higher levels of coverage lead to 
lower levels of its use. However, testing the effects of change in coverage demonstrates signs 
of an opposite effect and therefore these results are not strong enough for solid conclusions. The 
unusual differences between results of the two different regression models are intriguing as they 
only occur for sales manipulation. With all control variables being the same in these two models, 
one explanation could be that the instrumental variable of expected coverage which is used in 
the 2SLS regressions may be more meaningful in the context of sales manipulation compared 
to the other methods, resulting in stronger outcomes. This could be further researched by running 
the 2SLS regressions using other instrumental variables and comparing the differences in 
results. 
Finally, in addition to measuring the use of the above earnings management methods separately, 
I also applied the sum of these three as an indicator of total earnings management use. While it 
is important to note that this metric only considers these three methods and overlooks possible 
other ways of managing earnings, the results offer no evidence of any meaningful association 
between analyst coverage and total earnings management. This may indicate that the effects of 
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the three methods are quite different from each other and that none of them are strong enough 
alone to impact the results of the combined use. 
The results of this study expand the existing literature regarding the effects that analyst coverage 
has on management behavior, specifically earnings management use. It offers a broader 
perspective on geographical differences as most prior research focuses solely on US companies, 
also presenting the possibility that some of the limited research done earlier on international 
markets may not be extensive enough for reliable conclusions. The interrelated use and effects 
of different earnings management methods in relation to analyst coverage also remains a rather 
scarcely researched topic. While it does not establish clear conclusions on these effects, this 
study does monitor three different methods using the same sample to offer indication of any 
possibly links between them along with raising questions for future research. From a practical 
standpoint, understanding management behavior is a valuable part of investing decisions which 
again improves the functioning of capital markets, and these results can also be used to expand 
that knowledge. 
The most obvious limitations of this study and its results have to do with the methodology. 
There are always decisions to be made on which models to use for the most accurate, consistent, 
and comparable results. Overproduction and sales manipulation have rather established models, 
but the measurement of discretionary accrual use offers several options from how to calculate 
total accruals to which of the rather similar but still slightly different estimation models to use. 
While the data sample is extensive and a good representation of the target population, measuring 
initial increases in coverage from zero to one and complete coverage losses from one to zero 
lead to severe exclusions to the sample size and thus results that are not fully reliable. 
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7 Conclusions 
The effects of external monitoring on manager behaviour has been a focus of academic research 
for decades with one of the key topics being the use of earnings management. Managers have 
various incentives to manipulate their reported earnings both upwards and downwards, and this 
offers a fascinating opportunity to study how the presence of external monitoring by stock 
market analysts changes manager behaviour. To make this an even more interesting topic of 
research, two arguments completely contrary to each other both appear just as reasonable and 
logical. There is the ‘monitoring’ argument based on which the presence of analysts should 
constrain managers from committing any type of wrongdoing or misleading activities. And then 
there is the opposing ‘pressure’ argument which assumes that the pressure caused by analysts 
and their estimates lead managers to using earnings management to achieve short-term market 
expectations. However, given the different ways in which earnings management can be executed 
– the accounting-based discretionary accrual use and the operational-based activities referred to 
broadly as real earnings management – perhaps neither argument is entirely true and the effects 
depend on how manipulation is carried out? 
This thesis studies the effects that analyst coverage has on earnings management behaviour 
among Finnish listed companies, examining the use of three different earnings management 
methods in different situations concerning analyst coverage. Using a total sample of 1640 firm-
year observations from years 2005 to 2018, I find strong evidence that the way firms choose to 
manage their earnings is influenced by their level of analyst coverage. The key findings begin 
with a significant negative association between analyst coverage and discretionary accrual use 
across all measurements, with covered firms using it less than uncovered firms, more coverage 
indicating less use, as well as a similar negative effect from changes in coverage when 
monitoring both the direction and magnitude of change. Coverage is also associated with the 
use of overproduction, though not as extensively as with discretionary accruals. The association 
is mostly positive but does not appear to be noticeably affected by the magnitudes of coverage 
or change in coverage, only whether a firm is covered or not and what direction of change its 
coverage experiences. In summary, covered firms are found to use less overproduction than 
uncovered firms, and an increase in coverage results in more use while a decrease in coverage 
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results in less. Based on the findings of this study, analyst coverage is not associated with the 
use of sales manipulation in a significant manner.  
I also calculate the combined use of these three methods and find that analyst coverage does not 
appear to significantly impact a firm’s total use of earnings management. This may indicate that 
the use and subsequent effects of the three methods are quite independent of each other and that 
none of them seem strong enough alone to impact the results of the combined use. Overall, these 
results suggest that both the ‘monitoring’ and ‘pressure’ arguments apply, depending however 
on which earnings management method is being used as the monitoring effect of analysts 
appears to be true with regards to discretionary accruals while the pressure effect may apply to 
overproduction. This highlights the need to consider earnings management as individual 
methods instead of a broad term while also further researching the relationships between the 
different methods. 
Two hypotheses were set for this study in Chapter 4.1, the first being that analyst coverage is 
negatively associated with the use of discretionary accruals. The findings of all the tests carried 
out in this study provide strong support for this hypothesis. The second hypothesis stated that 
analyst coverage is positively associated with the use of sales manipulation and overproduction. 
This hypothesis is only partially supported by the findings of this study as overproduction shows 
a mostly positive association, though it does not apply to the magnitudes of level and change in 
coverage as explained above and in more detail in Chapter 6. In addition, the results do not 
support any kind of significant association between analyst coverage and sales manipulation. 
These two methods were grouped together in one hypothesis since prior research has mostly 
found their use to behave in similar ways, but also in part because they are generally included 
under the term “real earnings management”, referring to actions related to actual business 
operations. However, the results of this study show that perhaps this categorization should not 
be taken as anything more than a way of identifying different types of earnings management 
methods. Assuming any other shared characteristics or effects of these methods simply based 
on which category they belong to may lead to false conclusions. 
The results of this thesis contribute to existing literature by expanding the geographical coverage 
as most prior studies have focused solely on US companies. Improving the understanding of 
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behavioural patterns globally is beneficial both for individuals and to support future research of 
other market and management behaviour. Most prior literature focuses on a single earnings 
management method whereas three methods are used here simultaneously to try and uncover 
any patterns among each other as well to get a more comprehensive view of earnings 
management use. In general, not treating earnings management as a single term, or real earnings 
management as just one uniform group of methods, but separately considering all the different 
actions that are available to managers seems crucial if both academics and investors wish to 
fully understand the behavioural aspects of financial reporting. Finally, a new easily accessible 
but effective instrumental variable alternative is presented which captures the variation in a 
firms’ analyst coverage resulting from the overall analyst activity in the marketplace. 
The outcomes of this thesis reveal many directions in which future studies can expand research 
around this topic. For a complete picture of earnings management behaviour, it would be 
beneficial to recognize all the different ways of manipulating earnings and research them side 
by side using the same data sets and methods for consistent and comparable results. For 
example, this study showed some opposite characteristics in the use of discretionary accruals 
and overproduction, therefore further researching potential simultaneous effects between 
methods could prove insightful. It would also make sense to look deeper into sub-samples such 
as industry-level results to understand if the effects originate primarily from certain industries, 
especially since the different methods may have certain industries to which they apply more 
heavily. Some of the findings proved inconsistent with prior limited results for Finland, possibly 
indicating that further geographical expansion of thorough research may be necessary. Lastly, 
this thesis does not intend to explain detailed reasons for why the reported relationships between 
analyst coverage and earnings management exist, it simply shares the findings. However, 
establishing the root causes behind these findings and more research into the behavioural 
explanations of the relationships overall would offer increased clarity and ultimately an 
improved understanding of the behaviour of capital markets. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics of sub-samples by industry and year 
 
ICB class Industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 N
0 Oil & Gas 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 18
1000 Basic Materials 5 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 11 11 11 11 10 9 122
2000 Industrials 28 35 36 37 38 39 39 40 41 43 47 48 47 52 570
3000 Consumer Goods 13 14 14 14 14 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 17 19 202
4000 Health Care 2 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 6 8 8 10 10 81
5000 Consumer Services 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 11 11 13 14 15 15 151
6000 Telecommunications 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 31
7000 Utilities 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14
8000 Financials 8 8 9 9 9 8 8 7 7 8 9 10 9 11 120
9000 Technology 13 15 17 18 18 18 18 18 19 20 19 21 21 23 258
N 81 96 100 103 105 105 103 107 112 117 126 132 135 145 1567
ICB class Industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 N
0 Oil & Gas 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 18
1000 Basic Materials 6 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 10 11 11 11 10 10 123
2000 Industrials 36 35 36 37 38 39 39 40 41 43 49 50 49 51 583
3000 Consumer Goods 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 17 19 204
4000 Health Care 1 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 6 7 7 8 7 74
5000 Consumer Services 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 13 14 15 15 157
6000 Telecommunications 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 31
7000 Utilities 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14
8000 Financials 9 9 9 8 8 9 8 9 10 12 14 15 14 16 150
9000 Technology 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 19 19 20 19 22 21 22 268
N 97 100 103 103 105 107 105 110 114 121 132 139 140 146 1622
ICB class Industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 N
0 Oil & Gas 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 18
1000 Basic Materials 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 10 10 10 9 9 115
2000 Industrials 33 32 32 34 34 36 36 37 38 39 42 44 44 43 524
3000 Consumer Goods 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 15 197
4000 Health Care 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 6 6 7 8 66
5000 Consumer Services 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 11 10 13 14 14 14 153
6000 Telecommunications 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 31
7000 Utilities 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14
8000 Financials 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 29
9000 Technology 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 9 9 9 11 133
N 80 82 82 85 85 87 87 89 92 94 101 105 104 107 1280
Discretionary accruals
Sales manipulation
Overproduction
